McKinley v. Casson, 80 A.3d 618

Background

On Oct. 3, 2009 Robert McKinley (motorcyclist) rear‑ended Michele Casson’s SUV near the Summit Bridge; McKinley was not wearing a helmet and sustained serious injuries.
Casson told police she has a fear of bridges, takes medication for anxiety, and had an anxiety attack causing her to stop; she received a careless‑driving citation.
McKinley sued Casson for negligence and subpoenaed Casson’s medical records from her treating physician; Casson moved for a protective order and to exclude evidence of her medical history. The Superior Court granted protection and excluded medication evidence but denied summary judgment.
At trial the court allowed: (a) a police officer (Downer) to offer lay opinion about the point/manner of impact, (b) EMT Brandon Thomas to testify about bystanders’ statements under the present‑sense impression exception, and (c) references that McKinley was not wearing a helmet; the court excluded references to Casson’s medication.
The jury found Casson not negligent. McKinley appealed several evidentiary rulings; Casson cross‑appealed denial of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (McKinley)	Defendant's Argument (Casson)	Held
1) Access to Casson’s medical records / physician‑patient privilege	Casson relied on her anxiety as a defense; records are relevant and privilege waived	Denial of waiver; records privileged and irrelevant without expert	Court: privilege waived because Casson affirmatively relied on treated condition; access should have been allowed (but expert needed to use records)
2) Exclusion of references to Casson’s medication	Downer’s testimony that Casson said she takes meds is relevant to her anxiety and explains sudden stop; probative value > prejudice	Testimony irrelevant and prejudicial; could confuse jury	Court: exclusion abused; medication evidence was relevant and admissible subject to cross‑examination
3) EMT Thomas’s testimony recounting bystanders’ statements	Testimony was hearsay not within an exception and should be excluded	Admissible as present‑sense impression	Court: admission was error — Thomas could not show declarants personally perceived event; present‑sense exception inapplicable
4) Evidence & instruction about McKinley not wearing a helmet / assumption of risk	Helmet non‑use not relevant to comparative negligence or mitigation; no duty to wear helmet for adults	Helmet non‑use bears on secondary assumption of risk and mitigation	Court: helmet evidence inadmissible; no common‑law duty to wear helmet and no basis for assumption‑of‑risk instruction; instruction improper
5) Allowing Downer to give lay opinion about pre‑impact maneuvers	Officer’s comments were speculative expert testimony on cause and should be excluded	Answer was a permissible lay opinion based on perception and helpful to jury	Court: admission proper as limited lay opinion under D.R.E. 701 (officer did not opine on primary cause)
6) Denial of Casson’s summary judgment motion	McKinley’s collision shows failure to keep safe distance / speed thus Casson’s motion should have been granted	Factual dispute over whether Casson’s panic attack and sudden stop caused collision; jury issue	Court: denial correct — factual dispute exists that a jury must resolve

Key Cases Cited

Wright v. State, 25 A.3d 747 (Del. 2011) (standard of appellate review for evidentiary rulings)
Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254 (Del. 1995) (waiver and fairness principles for privilege issues)
Spencer v. Wal‑Mart Stores East, LP, 930 A.2d 881 (Del. 2007) (secondary assumption of risk analysis; distinguishable facts)
Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 996 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. 1999) (discussion on waiver of medical‑privilege by relying on condition)
Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1985) (requirement for circumstantial evidence that declarant perceived event for present‑sense exception)
Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390 (Del. 1992) (standards for admitting hearsay under residual exception)