McKinley Kelly v. Richard Brown, 17-1244

McKinley Kelly, convicted in Indiana of two murders committed when he was 16, received two consecutive 55-year terms (110 years total); parole eligibility in 2050 when he will be 70.
Kelly seeks authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) to file a second or successive § 2254 habeas petition, arguing Miller v. Alabama and its retroactivity in Montgomery v. Louisiana entitle him to resentencing.
Indiana sentencing scheme set a 55-year presumptive term for murder, allowed +/-10 years for special circumstances, and permitted consecutive or concurrent terms, so Kelly’s effective exposure ranged from 45 to 130 years.
At sentencing the trial judge identified six aggravators and two mitigators (age at offense and no adult/felony record); the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, noting the judge imposed the presumptive term and balanced aggravating and mitigating factors.
The majority held Kelly received the youth-consideration Miller requires because the judge had statutory discretion and expressly considered his age; authorization to file a successive petition was denied.
Judge Posner dissented, arguing Kelly’s 110-year term is a de facto life sentence, the sentencing consideration of youth was too cursory to meet Miller, and a district-court hearing should be allowed to determine incorrigibility.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Kelly may file a second/successive §2254 challenging his sentence under Miller/Montgomery	Miller/Montgomery apply retroactively; Kelly’s 110-year term is functionally a life sentence requiring Miller-based resentencing	Indiana judge had statutory discretion and did consider Kelly’s youth; sentence not mandatory life so Miller relief not warranted	Denied authorization; application dismissed (majority)
Whether a term-of-years that makes release unlikely qualifies as a "life" sentence under Miller	110 years is de facto life given parole timing and mortality data	State argues sentencing scheme allowed individualized sentencing and considered youth, so not equivalent to mandatory life	Majority: not enough—statutory discretion and consideration of youth sufficed; Dissent: term is effectively life and merits review
Whether sentencing court’s brief mention of age satisfied Miller’s requirement for special youth consideration	Kelly: cursory reference insufficient; need meaningful, individualized assessment of youth and its implications	State: court expressly noted age and weighed mitigators; judge balanced factors	Majority: citation of age and balancing by court adequate; Dissent: statement too cursory to show meaningful consideration

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional; requires special youth consideration)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller announced substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles categorically different for death-penalty sentencing rationale)
McKinley v. Butler, 809 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2016) (term-of-years can constitute a de facto life sentence for Miller purposes)
Kelly v. State, 719 N.E.2d 391 (Ind. 1999) (Indiana Supreme Court affirmed sentence after balancing aggravating and mitigating factors)