McKee v. Cosby, 874 F.3d 54

McKee, a long-time performer, publicly accused Bill Cosby of raping her in 1974 during a December 2014 New York Daily News interview amid many other Cosby-related sexual assault allegations.
Cosby’s lawyer Martin Singer sent a six-page letter to the Daily News the same day, bearing “Confidential” warnings, criticizing the paper and asserting that published information undermined McKee’s credibility.
Singer allegedly leaked the letter; excerpts were widely republished, and McKee sued Cosby for defamation in December 2015 (diversity jurisdiction), later amending to 24 counts.
The district court applied Michigan law (McKee domiciled in Michigan when the letter was published) and dismissed all counts, holding much of the Letter was opinion or disclosed underlying facts and that McKee was a limited-purpose public figure.
On appeal, the First Circuit reviewed de novo, addressed choice-of-law, First Amendment protections for opinion, public-figure standards, and whether specific allegedly false imputations were actionable.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Choice of law	Massachusetts law should apply	Michigan or Nevada law applies; Michigan chosen by district court	Michigan law applies (McKee domiciled in Michigan when injury occurred)
Public-figure status	McKee was a private individual regarding her allegation	McKee became a limited-purpose public figure by publicly joining controversy	McKee is a limited-purpose public figure as a matter of law
Opinion vs. provable fact	Letter’s attacks on credibility and implication rape allegation false are actionable statements of fact	Letter is opinion and discloses underlying facts, protecting it under First Amendment	Letter is largely non-actionable opinion because it disclosed underlying facts; reader could draw own conclusions
Alleged false quotations/contextual misstatements	Some quotations were taken out of context or falsely attributed (e.g., "I had to do a lot of lying") and imply criminal record	Quotations were accurate or hyperlinked to sources; broad media criticisms did not specifically refer to McKee	No plausible allegation of knowing or reckless falsity; contested quotes were either accurate with links or non-actionable; generalized statements did not concern McKee

Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119 (1st Cir.) (standard for reviewing motion to dismiss)
Pan Am Sys., Inc. v. Atl. Ne. Rails & Ports, Inc., 804 F.3d 59 (1st Cir.) (defamation statements must be capable of being proved true or false)
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1990) (no wholesale opinion exemption; test is whether statement implies provable facts)
Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ'ns, 953 F.2d 724 (1st Cir.) (opinion protected when underlying facts are disclosed allowing readers to draw conclusions)
Piccone v. Bartels, 785 F.3d 766 (1st Cir.) (expressions of subjective judgment often non-actionable)
Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282 (1st Cir.) (opinion immunized where speaker outlines facts and leaves conclusions to reader)
Gray v. St. Martin's Press, Inc., 221 F.3d 243 (1st Cir.) (distinguishing subjective views from factual assertions)
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (actual malice standard for public-figure plaintiffs)
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974) (private vs. public-figure distinctions and choice of law discussion for defamation)
Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (U.S. 1979) (distinguishing involuntary and voluntary public figures)
Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35 (1st Cir.) (speaker’s disclosure of facts can immunize implied factual assertions)