McKay v. United States
2011 WL 4389641
| 11th Cir. | 2011Background
- McKay charged August 25, 2005 in the Middle District of Florida with four cocaine offenses; pled guilty to all four counts on December 8, 2005.
- PSI initially set base offense level at 32; enhancement as career offender under § 4B1.1 raised offense level to 37, with total range 262–327 months after adjustments.
- McKay was classified as career offender based on two prior felonies: carrying a concealed weapon (crime of violence) and selling cocaine (controlled substance offense).
- At sentencing, McKay received a 262-month sentence (concurrent on Counts 1–3; 240 months on Count 4) within the career offender range; no direct appeal was filed.
- Amendment 706 lowered crack cocaine guidelines retroactively, but district court held career offender status not affected; McKay sought a § 3582(c)(2) reduction which the district court denied.
- McKay filed a pro se § 2255 motion on April 16, 2008 challenging the career-offender classification; district court denied as not cognizable under § 2255 and McKay appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McKay's § 2255 claim is cognizable against a Guidelines misapplication. | McKay argues Begay/Archer invalidate his career-offender status. | Government contends claim is noncognizable under § 2255. | Claim not cognizable; court affirms denial on procedural grounds. |
| Whether McKay procedurally defaulted his sentencing claim. | McKay asserts actual innocence to excuse default. | McKay failed to raise on direct appeal. | McKay procedurally defaulted; default not excused by actual innocence of sentence. |
| Whether the actual innocence exception applies to noncapital sentencing claims (innocence of sentence). | McKay seeks actual innocence to excuse legal innocence of predicate crime. | Actual innocence should apply only to factual innocence or capital sentencing context; not to legal innocence of predicate offenses. | Actual innocence exception does not apply to legal innocence of a predicate offense; cannot excuse default. |
| If applicable, whether the actual innocence exception extends to noncapital sentencing, and whether it's limited to factual innocence. | Some circuits apply to noncapital sentencing as factual innocence of predicate crimes. | Other circuits limit to capital sentencing or factual innocence; not applicable here. | Court declines to extend; even if extended, McKay fails under legal-innocence theory. |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (U.S. 2008) (limits 'violent felony' to crimes similar to enumerated examples; Begay informs 4B1.2)
- United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 2008) (applies Begay standard to 4B1.2; holding carrying a concealed weapon not a crime of violence)
- United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888 (4th Cir. 1994) (actual innocence of sentence extends to career-offender context in some circuits)
- Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2000) (actual innocence of sentence extended where predicate conduct not actually committed)
- United States v. Pettiford, 612 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2010) (limits actual-innocence-of-sentence to predicate-crime factual innocence; not purely legal)
- Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (U.S. 1992) (actual innocence of sentence defined; capital context guidance)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (U.S. 1998) (actual innocence requires factual innocence, not legal insufficiency)
- Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2004) (procedural default and cause-and-prejudice considerations)
- Haley v. United States, 541 U.S. 386 (U.S. 2004) (restraint in expanding exceptions to procedural-default rules; respect finality)
- Gilbert II, 640 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011) (savings clause; actual innocence not extending to noncapital misapplications (en banc))