McGuire v. United States
97 Fed. Cl. 425
Fed. Cl.2011Background
- McGuire leased 1,355 acres from CRIT; lease allows ingress/egress over existing roadways, with a BIA-owned canal and right-of-way; bridge at Eighth Avenue Mohave Road used since 1969.
- BIA planned removal of the unsafe bridge in January 2000; McGuire was advised to apply for a crossing permit to replace the bridge; he sought a permit but was not granted a replacement at that time.
- Bridge removal in January 2000; McGuire stopped paying January 1, 2000 rent; lease cancelled August 2000; subsequent BIA/Western Director decisions upheld cancellation.
- McGuire filed an inverse condemnation claim in bankruptcy; Ninth Circuit held the claim ripe but limited district court jurisdiction, remanding to the Court of Federal Claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
- Summary-judgment posture: government argues lack of ripeness and no cognizable property interest; expert evidence suggests substantial alternative access costs; factual questions remain.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the Ninth Circuit’s ripeness ruling bind this court as law of the case? | McGuire argues law-of-the-case requires adherence to ripeness holding. | Government argues transfer decision may not bind this court and deference doctrines apply differently. | Court abides by Ninth Circuit ripeness holding and applies Christianson framework. |
| Does McGuire have a legally cognizable property interest in the bridge/access? | Lease and access rights create a cognizable interest in access to the northern portion. | Interest depends on regulatory regime and possible revocation; may not be cognizable. | Summary judgment on this issue is premature; genuine issues of material fact remain. |
| Was there a compensable taking under Penn Central or Lucas? | Removal of bridge denied access, causing substantial economic injury and loss of use. | Economic impact and expectations must balance; not per se or total taking. | Lucas categorical taking denied; Penn Central factors require further factual development. |
| Are extraordinary delay or nuisance defenses applicable to defeat ripeness or takings claims? | Delay/futility exceptions could excuse failure to pursue administrative remedies. | Delay was not extraordinary; nuisance defense is not dispositive here. | No extraordinary circumstances to overturn ripeness; nuisance defense not determinative at this stage. |
Key Cases Cited
- Quality Tooling v. United States, 47 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (district bankruptcy jurisdiction over government contracts; transfer issues)
- Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (U.S. 1985) (final decision required for takings ripeness)
- Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (U.S. 2001) (administrative processes not always required; focus on reach of regulation)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (U.S. 2005) (substantially advances test rejected for takings)
- Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978) (Penn Central factors for regulatory takings)
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (U.S. 1992) (categorical taking where all economically beneficial use is lost)