83 F. Supp. 3d 1231
M.D. Ala.2015Background
- Michael McGuire, convicted in Colorado of sexual assault in 1986, moved to Montgomery, AL in 2010 and became subject to Alabama’s 2011 Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA), which is retroactive and applies for life.
- ASORCNA mandates broad requirements: lifetime registration (quarterly), community notification, residency and employment restrictions (2,000-foot rules), travel-permit requirements for trips of three+ days, driver’s-license branding, and numerous felony penalties for violations.
- In-town registrants must register with both municipal police and the county sheriff; homeless in-town registrants must check in weekly with both (up to 112 in-person check-ins/year). Travel permits likewise require duplicate applications to both jurisdictions for in-town registrants.
- McGuire sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging ASORCNA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; after motions and a four-day bench trial, claims narrowed to an ex post facto challenge seeking declaratory/ prospective relief against state officials.
- The court conducted the Smith v. Doe two-step ex post facto analysis (legislative intent; then punitive effects using Mendoza‑Martinez guideposts) and examined both individual provisions and cumulative effects, with particular focus on burdens on homeless in-town registrants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ASORCNA is punitive (Ex Post Facto) | McGuire: statute’s cumulative effects (lifetime retroactivity, residency/employment/travel limits, felony enforcement, driver’s‑license branding, dual reporting) are punitive and negate legislative civil intent | State: Legislature declared civil, provisions rationally related to public safety; many provisions have been upheld elsewhere; courts should defer to legislative label | Court: Legislature expressed nonpunitive intent (step 1). On step 2, most provisions are nonpunitive; but two duplicative/ excessive requirements are punitive (dual weekly registration for in‑town homeless; duplicate travel‑permit applications for all in‑town registrants) and violate Ex Post Facto |
| Standing to challenge various ASORCNA components | McGuire: has been and will be harmed (homelessness, employment refusals, travel deterred, fees risk) so he can challenge registration, notification, license branding, fees, residency, employment, travel | State: McGuire lacks concrete injury as to travel, employment, fees because he has no concrete travel plans, is not actively job‑seeking, and fees have been waived | Court: McGuire has standing for all challenged provisions listed (right to travel is deterred; employment offers were turned down; fee waiver does not eliminate substantial risk of future fee) |
| Proper defendants / relief posture (municipal v. state officials) | McGuire sought declaratory/prospective relief against city and state actors | Defendants argued many claims were redundant or barred (Eleventh Amendment, lack of municipal policymaking) | Court: Official‑capacity claims against municipal mayor/chief redundant and City dismissed; §1983 prospective relief against State Officials (AG, DPS Director, Sheriff) viable under Ex parte Young; declaratory relief granted limited to the two invalidated provisions |
| Scope of remedy / severability | McGuire: broader relief needed to ameliorate harms | State: challenge limited; enforcement and severability issues weigh against sweeping relief | Court: Severed the unconstitutional dual requirements; left remainder of ASORCNA intact; declaratory relief (with expectation state officials will comply) limited to invalidating dual weekly homeless registration and dual travel permit application requirements; relief prospective and does not apply to post‑ASORCNA convictions |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (establishes two‑step test for ex post facto challenges to sex‑offender statutes: legislative intent then effects analysis using Mendoza‑Martinez guideposts)
- United States v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 2011) (applies Smith framework to SORNA and treats many registry burdens as nonpunitive)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (articulates factors for determining whether civil measures are punitive)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (distinguishes civil regulatory commitments from punishment; discusses safeguards and scienter considerations)
- Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (rejects assessing a statute’s civil/punitive nature solely by its effect on a single individual)
- Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005) (analyzes residency restrictions and affirmative disabilities in ex post facto context)
- Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014) (registration fees not necessarily punitive when rationally tied to administrative costs)