493 S.W.3d 177
Tex. App.2016Background
- After a late-night collision that killed motorcyclist David Stidman, Sean McGuire (who had two prior out‑of‑state DWIs) was arrested and taken to a hospital; he refused a blood draw but police obtained blood without a warrant about 90 minutes after the crash showing BAC 0.16.
- McGuire was tried on a single jury for felony murder (based on felony DWI enhanced by two prior DWIs), intoxication manslaughter (submitted but jury was instructed it could not convict on both manslaughter and murder), and failure to stop and render aid; the jury convicted him of felony murder and failure to stop and render aid.
- Post‑trial, the State kept the intoxication‑manslaughter charge pending; McGuire sought habeas relief arguing double jeopardy and the trial court dismissed the manslaughter charge. The State appealed that habeas order.
- On appeal McGuire challenged multiple issues; the court found the warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, reversed the felony‑murder conviction and remanded for retrial on that charge.
- The court affirmed the conviction for failure to stop and render aid. Because the murder conviction was reversed, the habeas dismissal (double‑jeopardy relief) became moot and was vacated.
Issues
| Issue | McGuire's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Warrantless blood draw admissibility | Blood draw without consent or warrant violated Fourth Amendment; McNeely requires case‑by‑case exigency showing | Warrantless draw justified by Texas mandatory‑blood statute, exigent circumstances, or general balancing; good‑faith reliance | Blood draw unconstitutional: no exigency shown; statute doesn’t create per se exception; suppression warranted; conviction reversed |
| Indictment defect (act vs omission) | Indictment alleged omissions (failure to look, failure to evade) and thus fails to allege an "act" for felony murder | Omissions can involve affirmative acts; driving after drinking itself may be a dangerous act; indictment tracked statute | Indictment was legally sufficient; not fundamentally defective |
| Use of out‑of‑state probated DWI for enhancement | Probated Iowa conviction is not a "final conviction" for enhancement | Iowa and Texas law treat deferred judgment/probation for DWI as a prior conviction for enhancement | Probated out‑of‑state DWI counts for §49.09 enhancement; may be used to elevate DWI to felony |
| Venue change denial | Pretrial publicity pervasive and prejudicial; trial county cannot seat impartial jury | Publicity minimal in venire; voir dire showed jurors could be impartial | Trial court did not abuse discretion in denying venue change based on presented record |
| Failure to stop and render aid – sufficiency | McGuire argued he searched for what he hit and reasonably believed he hit an object; lacked knowledge of injury | Evidence shows he knew an accident occurred, did not stop or render reasonable assistance; others found the body nearby | Evidence legally sufficient; conviction affirmed |
| Jury instruction / double jeopardy on multiplicitous verdicts | Instruction limited jury to one guilty verdict (murder or manslaughter) | State wanted court to allow jury to convict on multiple counts and the State would later abandon duplicative punishments | Court erred in precluding jury from deciding both offenses; if retried both may be submitted but only one judgment may stand (vacate lesser if both convicted) |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol does not create per se exigency; exigency determined by totality of circumstances)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood draw is a Fourth Amendment search; exigency may justify warrantless blood draw in emergency)
- State v. Villarreal, 475 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (Texas implied‑consent statute does not by itself authorize a warrantless nonconsensual blood draw; must fit a recognized exception)
- Lomax v. State, 233 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (felony DWI can be an underlying felony for felony murder and the underlying felony may itself satisfy dangerous‑act requirement)
- Johnson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (same act may constitute both underlying felony and dangerous act for felony murder)
- Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985) (when multiple counts could not lawfully support multiple punishments, jury may be instructed on both but court must enter judgment on only one offense)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)