McGrew, Tracy Lynn Jr., PD-1204-17

Background

On March 20, 2016 Deputy Vasquez observed McGrew’s vehicle backed into a hotel parking stall with parking lights on and multiple occupants who began moving "frantically."
As Vasquez drove away then returned, she saw occupants shifting in the car, one looking back and appearing to move items in the backseat; the car turned on lights and left the lot.
Vasquez followed and stopped McGrew’s vehicle; during the suppression hearing she conceded she had "no idea of what crime" was being committed and that the behavior resembled that of law‑abiding people.
McGrew was charged with possession of marijuana; he moved to suppress evidence from the stop, which the trial court denied.
The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed; McGrew filed a petition for discretionary review arguing the stop lacked reasonable suspicion because the officer did not articulate a connection between observed behavior and a specific crime.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Must an officer articulate a connection between observed behavior and a specific crime to establish reasonable suspicion?	McGrew: Yes — reasonable suspicion requires articulable facts linking the suspect to a particular, codified offense.	State: No — totality of circumstances and suspicious conduct can justify an investigatory stop without naming a specific statute.	Court of Appeals: Affirmed denial of suppression; held the stop was justified under reasonable‑suspicion principles without requiring identification of a specific crime.
2) Were the observed facts (lights on, occupants’ frantic movement, looking back, leaving) distinguishable from innocent conduct?	McGrew: These facts are consistent with innocent behavior and do not meaningfully distinguish him from law‑abiding persons.	State: The combination of movements, furtive behavior, and departure from the scene supported an officer’s reasonable inference of wrongdoing.	Court of Appeals: Found the officer’s observations sufficient under the totality of circumstances to support the stop.
3) Can general area crime concerns, time of day, or officer intuition substitute for articulable suspicion?	McGrew: No — geographic/time factors and unparticularized hunches cannot alone validate a stop absent a link to criminal activity.	State: Such contextual factors contribute to the totality of circumstances a court must evaluate for reasonable suspicion.	Court of Appeals: Relied on the totality of circumstances, including officer observations and area context, to uphold the stop.
4) Is “criminal activity” meaningful only if tied to a codified law?	McGrew: Yes — the term must reference violation of a codified criminal statute to avoid arbitrary detentions.	State: Reasonable suspicion can target ongoing or impending unlawful conduct without the officer reciting a statute.	Court of Appeals: Did not require the officer to identify a particular statute; upheld the seizure on reasonable suspicion grounds.

Key Cases Cited

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Terry stop standard authorizing brief investigatory detention on reasonable suspicion)
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (government must articulate facts supporting reasonable suspicion)
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (limitations on seizures and need for particularized suspicion)
Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (examining facts that may support suspicion of impending criminal exploitation)
Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (requiring articulation of why behavior is suspicious under totality of circumstances)
Garcia v. State, 43 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (elements of reasonable suspicion test)
Brodnex v. State, 485 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App. 2016) (officer information must link a person to a particular crime to support detention)