McGregor v. River Pond Farm, LLC
312 Ga. App. 652
Ga. Ct. App.2011Background
- River Pond Farm, LLC sued to enjoin the McGregors from interfering with River Pond’s claimed easement across the McGregor property.
- The McGregors counterclaimed for quiet title and, without a jury demand, moved to submit the matter to a special master under OCGA § 23-3-63 et seq.
- A special master found a prescriptive easement in River Pond’s favor; the superior court adopted the master’s findings and entered judgment for River Pond.
- The road at issue runs across the McGregor property to the Bell property, existing since 1968 and used by the Bells/River Pond since then with McGregor knowledge.
- The 1972 division of the Howell estate left the road on property subsequently owned by the McGregors and Bell/River Pond, with permission historically implied or given by the dividing owners.
- The central legal question concerns whether permissive use beginning in 1968 could ripen into a prescriptive easement, considering notice/adverse-use requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prescriptive easement requires adverse notice to convert permissive use. | River Pond argued long use alone suffices as adverse notice. | McGregors contended repairs/uses begun permissively lack adverse notice. | Remand; correct legal framework needed, not affirm. |
| Whether use originating with permission can ever become prescriptive given notice requirements. | River Pond maintains continued use over decades shows adverse rights. | Permissive origin requiresnotice of adverse use to commence prescription. | Remand; existing record does not establish adverse use under proper law. |
| Whether the trial court properly adopted the special master’s findings and granted prescriptive easement. | River Pond relied on the master’s findings for summary-judgment-like relief. | McGregors argue the master’s legal basis was misapplied. | Remand; judgment cannot stand where the law was misapplied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Thornton v. Reb Properties, 237 Ga. 59 (Ga. 1976) (special master as arbiter of law and fact in quia timet actions; review of factual findings)
- Addison v. Reece, 263 Ga. 631 (Ga. 1993) (approval of special master approach; standards of review)
- Nelson v. Georgia Sheriffs Youth Homes, 286 Ga. 192 (Ga. 2009) (deferential review of trial court findings when supported by evidence)
- Gwinnett County v. Davis, 268 Ga. 653 (Ga. 1997) (reversal when trial judgment rests on erroneous legal theory)
- Burnum v. Thomas, 71 Ga. App. 690 (Ga. App. 1944) (permissive origin of use; repairs under permission do not create prescriptive rights)
- Ponder v. Williams, 80 Ga. App. 145 (Ga. App. 1949) (no prescriptive easement where use began with landowner permission)
- Douglas v. Knox, 232 Ga. App. 551 (Ga. App. 1998) (acquiescence alone insufficient to establish prescription)
- Bowen v. Lewis, 201 Ga. 487 (Ga. 1946) (landowner cannot grant an easement over own property before division)
- MEA Family Investments v. Adams, 284 Ga. 407 (Ga. 2008) (prescriptive rights require notice; strict construction)
- Yawn v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 307 Ga. App. 849 (Ga. App. 2011) (notice and adverse use in prescription disputes; repairs as notice)