McGraw v. University of Utah
2019 UT App 144
| Utah Ct. App. | 2019Background
- Bianca McGraw was hired by the University of Utah and soon reported regulatory noncompliance in a physician’s study; she was terminated about a month later and alleged retaliation under the Whistleblower Act (WBA).
- McGraw sent an internal “Retaliation Complaint” to the University’s General Counsel on February 23, 2017, but did not deliver that letter to the Utah Attorney General (AG) or the AG’s authorized agent.
- On April 14, 2017, McGraw delivered a notice of claim to the AG’s authorized agent containing substantially similar allegations.
- McGraw filed a district-court complaint on April 25, 2017, but did not serve the University until June 19, 2017.
- The University moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing McGraw failed to comply strictly with the Governmental Immunity Act (GIA): she mailed the February notice to the wrong office and (if the April 14 notice was the first valid notice) she filed suit before the mandatory 60-day waiting period expired.
- The district court denied dismissal based on McGraw’s claimed good-faith compliance; the Utah Court of Appeals reversed, holding strict GIA compliance was required and McGraw filed prematurely.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Feb. 23 letter was a valid GIA notice of claim | McGraw: Feb. 23 letter satisfied GIA; sent in good faith to University officials | Univ.: Letter was not delivered to AG or AG’s agent as required, so not a valid notice | Held: Not valid — GIA requires strict delivery to AG or authorized agent; good-faith delivery to the wrong office did not qualify |
| Whether a later April 14 notice tolled GIA waiting period such that filing April 25 was timely | McGraw: Filing was timely because she did not serve University until after 60 days elapsed (June 19) | Univ.: Filing the complaint (April 25) constitutes instituting an action; must wait 60 days after April 14 before filing | Held: Filing (April 25) prematurely instituted action; statute bars filing until claim denied or 60 days pass |
| Whether the district court may excuse technical defects under a "good faith"/equitable theory | McGraw: Significant good-faith compliance should excuse defects | Univ.: GIA demands strict compliance; statutory good-faith exceptions did not apply here | Held: Court may not excuse here; statutory exceptions did not cover delivery to wrong office within the same governmental entity |
| Whether failure to strictly comply deprives the court of jurisdiction | McGraw: (alternative) compliance occurred by service date | Univ.: Lack of strict compliance deprives court of subject matter jurisdiction | Held: Lack of strict compliance deprived the court of jurisdiction; dismissal required |
Key Cases Cited
- Hall v. Utah State Dep’t of Transp., 24 P.3d 958 (Utah 2001) (GIA’s 60-day waiting period bars initiation of suit until claim is denied or deemed denied)
- Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632 (Utah 2002) (GIA requires strict compliance with notice-of-claim delivery requirements)
- Thorpe v. Washington City, 243 P.3d 500 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) (interaction of WBA filing deadlines and GIA waiting period; notice must be filed early enough to preserve WBA limitations)