McGrath v. Dockendorf
292 Va. 834
| Va. | 2016Background
- In Aug. 2012 Dockendorf proposed to McGrath and gave a two-carat engagement ring worth about $26,000; the parties never married after the engagement was broken off in Sept. 2013.
- Dockendorf sued in detinue seeking return of the ring or its monetary value; trial court found the ring was a conditional gift and ordered return or judgment for $26,000.
- McGrath demurred, arguing Virginia’s "heart balm" statute, Code § 8.01-220, which abolished actions for alienation of affection, breach of promise to marry, and criminal conversation, barred the detinue action.
- Dockendorf argued the statute abolishes only the specified torts and does not prohibit actions grounded in the common-law rule of conditional gifts (detinue) to recover specific property.
- The trial court agreed with Dockendorf; the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed statutory construction de novo and affirmed, holding the heart balm statute does not bar detinue claims for conditional gifts such as engagement rings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dockendorf) | Defendant's Argument (McGrath) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Code § 8.01-220 bars an action to recover an engagement ring given in contemplation of marriage | Detinue for recovery of a conditional gift is distinct from abolished torts and is permissible | Recovery of the ring is effectively a breach-of-promise claim (or derivative of it) and thus barred by the heart balm statute | The statute does not bar detinue actions for conditional gifts; action allowed |
| Whether causes of action that have a "nucleus of operative facts" tied to a broken engagement are barred | The statute targets only three discrete common-law torts; related claims remain available | Any cause of action arising from a breached engagement should be foreclosed if it depends on the promise to marry | The statute targets specific torts; other remedies (e.g., contract, detinue) are not per se barred |
| Whether plaintiffs may recharacterize abolished torts under different labels to evade the statute | The court should permit recovery of specific property when source is conditional gift, not emotional damages | Allowing such suits would revive heart balm torts in disguise | Court distinguished this from attempts to relabel abolished torts; detinue is not a repackaged heart balm tort |
| Whether the unenforceability of a promise to marry renders the conditional gift’s condition void as against public policy | The condition is simply the occurrence of marriage; unenforceability of a breach action does not make the promise "illegal" or the conditional gift void | Because breach-of-promise remedies are barred, the condition fails and recovery should be blocked on policy grounds | Rejected: unenforceability of breach action does not negate the conditional-gift rule permitting detinue recovery |
Key Cases Cited
- Pretlow v. Pretlow, 177 Va. 524 (recognizes recovery for gifts given in contemplation of marriage when the marriage does not occur)
- McDermott v. Reynolds, 260 Va. 98 (2000) (heart balm statute bars actions that effectively revive abolished torts under other labels)
- Broad Street Auto Sales, Inc. v. Baxter, 230 Va. 1 (detinue’s object is recovery of specific personal property; damages limited to value if item cannot be returned)
- Vicars v. Atlantic Discount Co., 205 Va. 934 (elements required to succeed in detinue action)
- Jones v. Williams, 280 Va. 635 (statutory construction reviewed de novo)
- Pavlicic v. Vogtsberger, 136 A.2d 127 (Pa. 1957) (distinguishing recovery of conditional gift from damages for emotional injury)