McGrath v. Bureau of Prof'l & Occupational Affairs
146 A.3d 310
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | 2016Background
- Shannon McGrath, a registered nurse, was automatically suspended under Section 15.1(b) of the Professional Nursing Law after a felony Drug Act conviction (possession by misrepresentation). The Board issued a Notice of Automatic Suspension and she requested a hearing.
- The Board had historically exercised case-by-case discretion when restoring licenses suspended under Section 15.1(b), but in 2013 adopted (without formal rulemaking) a Bureau/Department directive treating such suspensions as effectively subject to Section 15.2 and the 10-year reapplication bar in Section 6(c)(1).
- In Packer v. Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, 99 A.3d 965 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), this Court earlier upheld the Board’s newer interpretation, holding that automatic suspensions under §225.1(b) are governed by the more restrictive reissuance rules (resulting in a mandatory 10-year period).
- The Board applied that interpretation here and denied McGrath reissuance relief, treating her suspension as subject to the 10-year bar for new applicants; McGrath appealed, arguing the change was unlawful and penal ambiguities must be construed in favor of the licensee.
- The en banc Commonwealth Court reconsidered Packer, concluded the statutory provisions remain ambiguous, invoked the rule of lenity and 1 Pa. C.S. §1928(b)(1), overruled Packer, and held that suspensions under §225.1(b) must be reviewed under the discretionary reissuance framework of §225 (not automatically treated as revocations under §225.2 with a mandatory 10-year reapplication requirement).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McGrath) | Defendant's Argument (Board) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an automatic suspension under §225.1(b) is subject to the mandatory reissuance restrictions of §225.2 (effectively a 10‑year bar under §216(c)(1)) | McGrath: §225.1(b) suspends the license, §225 allows discretionary reissuance; §225.2 applies only to revocations and should not be read into suspensions | Board: Reading provisions together and giving effect to “hereinafter” means §225.2 governs restoration for §225.1(b) suspensions; Packer supports this | The Court reversed Packer: §225.2 does not plainly apply to §225.1(b) suspensions; reissuance of such suspensions must be considered under §225’s discretionary standard |
| Whether Packer’s interpretation comported with the rule of lenity and §1928(b)(1) (strict construction of penal statutes) | McGrath: Statute is penal/ambiguous; penal provisions must be strictly construed against the government and in favor of the licensee; Packer imposed a harsher penalty without clear statutory language | Board: Packer correctly applied statutory construction and found the statute unambiguous when read as a whole; lenity not required | Held for McGrath: provisions are ambiguous and penal; rule of lenity and §1928(b)(1) require construing ambiguity against the government, so Packer is overruled |
| Whether the Board lawfully changed its long‑standing discretionary practice without promulgating a regulation | McGrath: The Board’s change was effectively a binding rule and should have been formally promulgated; licensees received no notice | Board: Change reflected statutory interpretation and was supported by Department/Bureau directive; Packer validated the outcome | Court emphasized the Board had not used formal interpretation and criticized the change; outcome favors requiring application of §225 discretion (and underscores problematic administrative directive) |
| Appropriate remedy for McGrath’s suspension | McGrath: Order should be reversed to allow discretionary reissuance review under §225; no mandatory 10‑year bar | Board: Order should be affirmed per Packer; mandatory 10‑year period applies | Court: Affirmed automatic suspension but reversed the Board to the extent it applied §225.2 and imposed a mandatory ≥10‑year bar; any reissuance requests must be reviewed under §225’s discretionary process |
Key Cases Cited
- Packer v. Bureau of Prof’l & Occupational Affairs, 99 A.3d 965 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014) (earlier panel upheld Board’s mandatory 10‑year reissuance interpretation; overruled here)
- Richards v. Pa. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 20 A.3d 596 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (explains rule of lenity and that ambiguities in penal statutes are construed against government)
- Sondergaard v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 65 A.3d 994 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (discusses when rule of lenity applies and requirement of clear statutory warning for penal consequences)
- Whalen v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 32 A.3d 677 (Pa. 2011) (example where plain statutory language obviated need for lenity analysis)
- Pa. State Real Estate Comm’n v. Keller, 165 A.2d 79 (Pa. 1960) (professional‑license disciplinary statutes are penal in nature and must be strictly construed)