McGovern v. George Washington University
245 F. Supp. 3d 167
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Raymond McGovern, a 71-year-old former CIA analyst, attended a ticketed George Washington University (GW) event where Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spoke; he stood silently and faced away from the stage wearing a Veterans for Peace shirt.
- Two GW Special Police Officers (SPOs), Corporal Brown and Captain Glaubach (commissioned by D.C.), approached McGovern in the auditorium after GWPD Chief Hay observed him standing; Brown touched McGovern and twice said, “Sir, can you please come with me.”
- A struggle occurred when officers attempted to escort McGovern out; he grabbed seat arms, was handcuffed in the lobby, briefly treated by EMS for bleeding wrists, taken to MPD custody, and no prosecution followed.
- McGovern sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging false arrest, excessive force, and First Amendment retaliation against GW and the three officers; cross-motions for summary judgment were filed.
- Court resolved procedural evidentiary dispute by striking a late-signed eyewitness declaration submitted by defendants but otherwise considered video and deposition evidence.
- On the merits, the court found the SPOs acted under color of state law, had probable cause to arrest McGovern for unlawful entry/refusal to quit, and that the force used was not objectively unreasonable; GW was not liable absent a constitutional violation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| State action: whether SPOs acted under color of state law when removing McGovern | McGovern: SPOs’ actions could be private enforcement of university policy, not state action | Defendants: initial approach/enforcement of private property rights was private, not state action | Court: SPOs acted under color of state law because their arrest-related actions invoked commission powers; state action existed |
| Qualified immunity: whether officers (private-employed SPOs) may claim it | McGovern: private SPOs should not get qualified immunity like public officers | Defendants: immunity issue is unresolved; but irrelevant here | Court: did not decide immunity—no need because no constitutional violation was found |
| Probable cause/false arrest: whether officers had probable cause to arrest for unlawful entry or other crimes | McGovern: no demand to leave, he didn’t hear officers, so no probable cause | Defendants: Brown’s contact and repeated “come with me” and visible officer authority gave probable cause for unlawful entry/refusal to quit | Court: probable cause existed for unlawful entry when officers asked him to leave and he failed to comply; no Fourth Amendment false arrest |
| Excessive force & First Amendment retaliation | McGovern: force was excessive and retaliatory for protected silent protest; First Amendment applies | Defendants: force was reasonable given resistance and security context; event on private property; First Amendment doesn’t apply here | Court: force objectively reasonable under Graham factors; no First Amendment claim (private property event) — summary judgment for defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (U.S. 1988) (§1983 requires action under color of state law)
- Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (U.S. 1964) (deputized/private actor exercising state authority can produce state action)
- Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (U.S. 1974) (state action requires close nexus between state and private conduct)
- McDougald v. United States, 350 A.2d 375 (D.C. 1976) (special police commission distinguishes private conduct from arrest-related state action)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (U.S. 2004) (probable cause may justify arrest for any offense supported by known facts)
- Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (U.S. 1964) (probable cause standard for arrests)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1989) ( Fourth Amendment excessive-force objective reasonableness test)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (U.S. 2009) (qualified immunity two-step framework)
- Wesby v. District of Columbia, 765 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (probable cause for unlawful entry where officers asked occupants to leave and occupants refused)