McGirt v. Oklahoma
140 S. Ct. 2452
| SCOTUS | 2020Background
- Creek Nation was promised a permanent, self-governing western homeland by treaties (1832, 1833, 1856, 1866) and received a patent in 1852; Congress repeatedly referred to a "Creek reservation."
- Jimcy McGirt (a Seminole enrollee) was convicted in Oklahoma state court of major crimes he committed in eastern Oklahoma and argued postconviction that the state lacked jurisdiction because the crimes occurred on Creek reservation land, invoking the Major Crimes Act (MCA).
- The MCA assigns exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain major crimes committed by Indians in "Indian country," defined in 18 U.S.C. §1151 to include Indian reservations "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent."
- Oklahoma defended the convictions by arguing (a) the Creek reservation was disestablished by Congress (through allotment-era statutes and statehood legislation), or (b) the MCA never applied to eastern Oklahoma after statehood (Enabling Act and territorial practice).
- The Supreme Court (Gorsuch, J.) held the Creek lands remained an Indian reservation for purposes of the MCA because Congress never clearly disestablished it; consequently Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to try McGirt for those major crimes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McGirt/Creek) | Defendant's Argument (Oklahoma) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Creek lands remain an Indian reservation for MCA purposes | Treaty promises, subsequent statutes, and §1151(a) show land is reservation; absence of a clear congressional disestablishment means reservation status persists | Allotment-era statutes, congressional acts, territorial practice, and statehood statutes cumulatively disestablished the reservation | Reservation continues because only Congress can disestablish and it did not clearly do so |
| Whether allotment or issuance of fee patents disestablished the reservation | Allotment and private patents do not by themselves alter reservation status; §1151(a) contemplates private ownership within reservations | Allotment, alienation, and sale to non‑Indians removed tribal character and thus disestablished the reservation | Allotment and patents alone do not amount to disestablishment absent clear congressional intent to do so |
| Whether extratextual evidence (contemporaneous understanding, demographics, practice) can show disestablishment | Can be used to interpret ambiguous statutes and demonstrate congressional intent when text is unclear | Such historical practice and demographics establish that de facto disestablishment occurred and should be decisive | Extratextual evidence may clarify ambiguity but cannot overcome clear statutory meaning; here the statutes do not clearly disestablish the reservation |
| Whether the MCA ever ceased to apply in eastern Oklahoma after statehood | MCA applies where land is Indian country; if reservation exists, federal exclusive jurisdiction controls major crimes by Indians | Oklahoma Enabling Act and territorial statutes transferred jurisdiction to state courts at statehood, making MCA inapplicable in eastern Oklahoma | MCA applied at statehood and continues to apply where land is Indian country; no statute removed it for eastern Oklahoma |
| Jurisdictional posture: may Court decide given state procedural rulings? | Federal question properly presented; certiorari granted to settle circuit split | State court invoked procedural bars and state rules; some Justices argued lack of federal jurisdiction to disturb state judgment on independent state ground | Majority proceeded to decide federal issue; Justice Thomas (separate dissent) argued the state procedural bar made the case nonjusticiable for this Court |
Key Cases Cited
- Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (disestablishment requires clear congressional intent; consider statute, contemporaneous events, and subsequent history)
- Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (2016) (reiterating Solem framework and emphasizing statutory text as starting point)
- United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (states may try non‑Indians for crimes against non‑Indians on former tribal lands)
- Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) (allotment does not necessarily eliminate reservation status)
- Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962) (opening reservation land to non‑Indian ownership does not itself disestablish reservation)
- Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs, including termination of treaties, but courts require clear congressional intent to disestablish)
- Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (contemporaneous and subsequent understandings can evidence congressional intent when statutes are ambiguous)
- Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994) (disestablishment may be shown by congressional action such as restoring land to the public domain)
- South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998) (subsequent treatment of lands has limited but real evidentiary value)
- Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017) (Tenth Circuit held Creek lands still a reservation; created circuit split prompting certiorari)