McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 821 S.E.2d 700

Background

McGinnis was convicted in Lynchburg Circuit Court of three counts of larceny by worthless check (Va. Code § 18.2‑181) after issuing three checks to the Kirkley Hotel that later were returned for insufficient funds.
The circuit court found McGinnis lacked credibility about any agreement to delay deposit of the checks and convicted him; sentence: nine years, with six years six months suspended.
On day 20 after entry of judgment McGinnis (pro se) filed a motion to set aside the verdict/new trial; the motion was signed by him but not by trial counsel and was denied by the circuit court.
Appellate counsel filed a notice of appeal and a petition to the Court of Appeals alleging sufficiency of the evidence; the Court of Appeals declined to reach the merits, holding the issue unpreserved under Rule 5A:18 because the post‑verdict motion was not signed by counsel and could not be cured on appeal.
In the Supreme Court appeal, the Court assumed without deciding that the Court of Appeals could have reached the merits, reversed the Court of Appeals, and reviewed de novo the statutory construction and sufficiency question.
On the merits the Supreme Court held the 1978 amendment to § 18.2‑181 (adding language about checks as present consideration for goods or services) did not limit the statute; the conviction was supported by sufficient evidence (knowledge of insufficient funds and intent to defraud) and was affirmed.

Issues

Issue	McGinnis' Argument	Commonwealth's Argument	Held
Whether McGinnis preserved a sufficiency challenge for appeal when his post‑verdict motion was filed pro se and unsigned by trial counsel	The pro se motion and the circuit court’s ruling preserved the issue; appellate counsel’s later attempt to sign the motion was a prompt cure under Code § 8.01‑271.1	A represented party may not file pleadings pro se; an unsigned pleading by a represented defendant is invalid and cannot be cured after the matter leaves the circuit court’s jurisdiction	Court declined to decide the preservation question; assumed without deciding the issue was before the Court of Appeals and reversed the Court of Appeals’ procedural ruling
Whether appellate counsel could append his signature on appeal to cure the trial‑court signature omission under Code § 8.01‑271.1	Counsel acted promptly to cure once the omission was called to his attention and thus the motion should stand	The statute does not permit counsel to remedy the defect long after the case left the circuit court	Not decided; Court explained § 8.01‑271.1’s safe harbor did not apply here because the motion was signed by the defendant (so the statute’s ‘‘unsigned’’ cure provision was inapplicable)
Whether § 18.2‑181 is limited to checks given as present consideration for goods/services (post‑1978 amendment)	The 1978 amendment narrows § 18.2‑181 to applies only when the check is payment as present consideration for goods/services	The amendment expanded or clarified that services are covered but did not limit the statute’s application to only such checks; the statute still criminalizes passing worthless checks with intent to defraud regardless of the object of payment	Held that § 18.2‑181 is not so limited; the amendment expanded coverage to include services but did not restrict earlier sweep; convictions affirmed as supported by evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds and intent to defraud

Key Cases Cited

Shipe v. Hunter, 280 Va. 480 (2010) (on invalidity of pleadings signed only by persons not licensed to practice law in Virginia)
Payne v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 485 (1981) (larceny by worthless check completed when defendant utters a check he knows to be worthless)
Lund v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 688 (1977) (common‑law larceny generally does not cover services; legislative clarity required to criminalize taking of services)
Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510 (2008) (de novo review of appellate court’s application of preservation rules)
Granado v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 402 (2016) (jurisdiction and handling of appellate records; appellate court’s control of the record)