2021 Ohio 2741
Ohio Ct. App.2021Background
- Developer Ricottilli recorded the Catarina Place Declaration of Covenants in 2004, which required developer review initially and transferred design-review authority to an HOA/Design Review Committee (DRC) ten years after recording or when 80% of lots sold (i.e., in 2014).
- No homeowners association existed through 2014–2018; Ricottilli continued acting as the Design Review Board (DRB) and approved multiple builds. The Catarina Place HOA (CPHOA) and a DRC were not formed until January 2019.
- The McGiffins built a house and a detached shed in 2013. The Skuriches purchased the adjacent lot and submitted Original Plans in 2017 showing a two-story rear storage unit (first floor: two-car garage; second floor: storage) plus a three-car garage in the main house (5 total garage spaces). Poland Township issued a zoning permit, and Ricottilli reviewed/approved the design.
- The McGiffins sued in August 2017 seeking declaratory relief and injunctive relief alleging deed-restriction violations; a magistrate issued a short-lived TRO. During litigation the Skuriches revised plans: reduced total garage spaces to four and replaced a breezeway with a fully enclosed connector between the storage unit and the house.
- The trial court (June 19, 2020) ruled for the Skuriches on the McGiffins’ complaint and for the McGiffins on the Skuriches’ counterclaims, allowed the Skuriches to build under the Revised Plans (Exhibit B), and ordered recording of a 2006 Amendment addressing sheds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of Declaration provision requiring submission of plans to an HOA/DRC when no HOA existed in 2017 | McGiffins: provision is enforceable; Skuriches must submit plans to the DRC once it exists | Skuriches: provision was unenforceable in 2017 because no HOA/DRC existed and developer acted as DRB; prior approvals stood | The court held the DRC-submission requirement was unenforceable against Skuriches under these facts; developer approval and township permit controlled. |
| Must Skuriches submit Revised Plans to the CPHOA DRC formed in 2019? | McGiffins: Revised Plans must be reviewed by the newly formed DRC | Skuriches: Original plans were already approved by developer/township; Revised Plans contain only minor changes | The court held they need not resubmit; requiring a second full review would be duplicative given prior approvals and only minor revisions. |
| Whether garage capacity violated the 2–4 vehicle limit (Section 4.1) | McGiffins: Original design exceeded the 4-vehicle max (5 spaces) | Skuriches: Revised Plans reduced capacity to four vehicles | Held: Revised Plans comply with the 2–4 vehicle requirement. |
| Whether the rear storage unit was an "unattached building/shed" (Section 4.12) | McGiffins: storage unit is an unattached shed and thus prohibited | Skuriches: storage unit is attached via foundation and roof (and enclosed connector); Poland Township so defined | Held: Storage unit is attached under Township definition; not an unattached shed; Section 4.12 not violated. |
| Whether McGiffins’ house/shed violate setback and unattached-building provisions (cross-appeal) | Skuriches: McGiffins’ house encroaches setback and their freestanding shed violates prohibitions | McGiffins: developer (DRB) approved minor setback variance; a 2006 Amendment (unrecorded at suit start) allowed one reasonable shed per lot and was relied on by developer | Held: Ricottilli’s prior approvals and exercise of discretion made the setback variance permissible; the Amendment justified the shed; trial court did not err. |
| Abuse of process and TRO objections (cross-appeal) | Skuriches: McGiffins litigated and used settlement to impose personal design preferences (ulterior motive); TRO improperly granted | McGiffins: litigation and settlement conduct was legitimate; TRO was a procedural remedy | Held: Skuriches failed to prove abuse of process (no ulterior purpose or improper use of process); TRO challenge is moot (expired) and trial ultimately resolved substantive rights. |
Key Cases Cited
- Long Beach Assn., Inc. v. Jones, 82 Ohio St.3d 574 (1998) (contract/conveyance construction is a question of law; interpret deeds by their plain language)
- Siltstone Resources, LLC v. Ohio Pub. Works Comm'n, 137 N.E.3d 144 (7th Dist. 2019) (contract-construction rules apply to deed restrictions)
- LRC Realty, Inc. v. B.E.B. Props., 155 N.E.3d 852 (Ohio 2020) (interpretation of deeds: give effect to parties' intent from four corners)
- Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963 (Ohio 2002) (definition and nature of restrictive covenants)
- Driscoll v. Austintown Assocs., 328 N.E.2d 395 (Ohio 1975) (courts disfavor restrictions on property use; construing restrictive covenants strictly against limitations)
- Cincinnati City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Conners, 974 N.E.2d 78 (Ohio 2012) (restrictive covenants strictly construed against increased restriction)
- Yaklevich v. Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe Co., L.P.A., 626 N.E.2d 115 (Ohio 1994) (elements and nature of abuse of process tort)
- Clermont Envtl. Reclamation Co. v. Hancock, 474 N.E.2d 357 (Ohio App. 1984) (abuse of process defined; misuse of process requires ulterior purpose)
- Spercel v. Sterling Indus., Inc., 285 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1972) (public policy favoring settlement and compromise)