McGhie v. State
144 A.3d 752
| Md. | 2016Background
- McGhie was convicted by a Montgomery County jury (murder, attempted murder, handgun use, conspiracy) based primarily on accomplice Edward Borrero’s testimony and corroborating witnesses; ballistics evidence linked shell casings from the crime scene to a prior shooting involving McGhie via expert Joseph Kopera.
- At trial Kopera testified as a highly experienced ballistics expert and claimed engineering degrees from RIT and University of Maryland and graduation from the FBI Academy; the jury convicted McGhie on all counts.
- Years later, evidence surfaced that Kopera had lied about his academic credentials and had submitted a forged transcript; McGhie filed a Petition for Writ of Actual Innocence under Md. Code, Crim. Proc. § 8-301 alleging the lies were newly discovered evidence likely to produce a different result.
- The circuit court held a hearing, found the credential falsehoods were newly discovered, rejected waiver, and applied an analysis that both (a) excised the false testimony and assessed remaining evidence and (b) considered whether jurors, if told of the lies, would have discounted Kopera’s testimony altogether; the judge denied relief, concluding the remaining evidence still supported the verdict.
- The Court of Special Appeals affirmed; the Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed the lower courts, holding that courts must look back to the trial and assess whether jurors’ knowledge of the falsity could have led them to discredit the expert’s substantive testimony, but that in this case McGhie failed to meet § 8-301’s substantial/significant-possibility burden.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper temporal approach under § 8-301: retrospective vs. prospective | § 8-301 requires a retrospective analysis: ask whether the newly discovered evidence would have created a substantial or significant possibility of a different result at the actual trial | State urged a prospective approach: imagine a new trial without the perjured testimony and decide whether outcome would differ | Court held § 8-301 requires a retrospective look to the actual trial and its jury — courts must ask how the new evidence would have affected jurors at that trial |
| How to treat newly discovered evidence that an expert lied about credentials | Court should consider whether jurors, if informed of the lie, might discredit the expert’s substantive testimony (not just excise the credential statements) | State urged merely excising the false credential statements and evaluating the remainder of the expert evidence | Court held that simply excising the credentials is inadequate; courts must consider whether the lie would have caused jurors to doubt the expert’s substantive opinions |
| Burden and application of the § 8-301 substantial/significant-possibility standard | McGhie argued Kopera’s perjury undermined ballistics linkage and, if known, could have led jurors to reject that evidence and change the verdict | State acknowledged the lie but argued other strong corroborating evidence would still permit the verdict; also argued waiver and due diligence issues | Court applied the substantial/significant-possibility standard, affirmed denial: although jurors might have discounted Kopera, the remaining independent trial evidence was sufficient that McGhie did not carry his burden |
| Pleading requirement under Rule 4-332(d)(9) and § 8-301 jurisdiction | McGhie contended his petition was timely and substantively adequate; circuit court heard the petition on the merits | Dissent argued Rule 4-332(d)(9) requires an explicit averment of actual innocence and that failure to plead it should compel dismissal | Majority reached merits (finding substantial compliance and no objection by State); concurrence agreed but said normally failure to plead actual innocence should be fatal; dissent would dismiss for noncompliance |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hunt, 443 Md. 238 (Md. 2015) (discusses application of § 8-301 to expert-credential falsity and encourages consideration of juror reaction)
- Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156 (Md. 2011) (new-trial decisions on newly discovered evidence are within the hearing court’s discretion)
- Yorke v. State, 315 Md. 578 (Md. 1989) (defines the substantial or significant possibility standard)
- Kulbicki v. State, 207 Md. App. 412 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (postconviction decision excising false credential testimony; discussed in later opinions)
- Plude v. State, 310 Wis.2d 28 (Wis. 2008) (expert lied about credentials; court held credentials falsehood could affect the reliability of substantive testimony)
- Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (U.S. 1998) (distinguishes claims of legal insufficiency from claims of actual innocence relevant to retrospective analyses)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (U.S. 1995) (framework for assessing actual innocence claims and finality concerns)