McGhee v. State, 284 A.3d 777

McGhee was tried for a 2007 murder; during voir dire the court asked whether jurors believed the State must present fingerprint, DNA, ballistic, or other scientific evidence in every case. Trial counsel did not object. A jury convicted McGhee; sentence was life.
The State’s proof included eyewitness identifications, recovery of a sawed-off shotgun (forensics inconclusive), and incriminating statements; McGhee offered an alibi.
After this Court later decided a trilogy of CSI-effect decisions (Charles, Atkins, Stabb, 2010–2011) holding certain CSI-related bench remarks or instructions could improperly invade the jury’s province, McGhee filed a post-conviction ineffective-assistance claim (raised 2014) for counsel’s failure to object to the voir dire question.
The post-conviction court granted a new trial; the Court of Special Appeals reversed, finding no evidence that objecting to CSI-effect voir dire was the prevailing professional norm in 2007.
The Court of Appeals granted review and held that Strickland requires assessing counsel by the professional norms existing at the time of the conduct (2007); it declined to judge counsel by later CSI-effect decisions and concluded counsel’s failure to object was not constitutionally deficient.

Issue	McGhee's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Charles/Atkins/Stabb apply retroactively to cases final before those decisions	These cases establish the error was clear and should be applied on collateral review, so counsel’s failure to object was deficient and prejudicial	Retroactivity cannot be used to assess competence under Strickland; performance must be judged by norms at the time of trial	Court: Retroactivity analysis is not compatible with Strickland’s performance prong; did not apply those later cases to judge 2007 counsel performance
Whether failure to object to the CSI-effect voir dire question was ineffective assistance	Counsel’s failure to object undermined the defense (which relied on lack of forensic proof) and, with benefit of later cases, was deficient and prejudicial	At trial (2007) prevailing norms did not require objection; Evans and contemporaneous practice made an objection unlikely to be meritorious	Court: Under 2007 professional norms, counsel’s conduct was not objectively unreasonable; Strickland performance prong not met, claim fails

Charles v. State, 414 Md. 726 (2010) (held certain non-neutral CSI-effect voir dire/instructions could improperly invade jury province)
Atkins v. State, 421 Md. 434 (2011) (reversed conviction where anti-CSI instruction was unnecessary and invaded jury province under the case facts)
Stabb v. State, 423 Md. 454 (2011) (preemptive anti-CSI jury instruction was reversible error where it risked relieving the State of its burden)
Evans v. State, 174 Md. App. 549 (2007) (intermediate appellate dicta upheld an instructional formulation and cautioned against predominance of such instructions)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel; performance judged by norms at time of conduct)
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (prejudice prong cannot be decided by retroactive changes in law; distinguishes performance and prejudice)
State v. Armstead, 235 Md. App. 392 (2018) (Court of Special Appeals held failure to object to CSI-effect voir dire in 2009 did not amount to deficient performance given prevailing norms)
Taylor v. State, 473 Md. 205 (2021) (addressed improper sua sponte anti‑CSI instruction; procedural posture complicated retroactivity analysis)