304 Ga. 683
Ga.2018Background
- Jeffrey McGee pleaded guilty under North Carolina v. Alford in 2001 to malice murder, aggravated battery on a police officer, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in exchange for the State withdrawing the death penalty; he stipulated an aggravating circumstance allowing life without parole.
- The trial court sentenced McGee to life without parole for murder, 20 years concurrent for aggravated battery, and 5 years concurrent for possession; no timely direct appeal was taken.
- Over many years McGee pursued multiple collateral challenges and motions (habeas, motions to withdraw pleas, motion for out-of-time appeal); this case represents his appeal following denial of an out-of-time appeal after remand and evidentiary hearing.
- The trial court later merged the aggravated battery conviction into the murder conviction and vacated the 20-year sentence for aggravated battery; the State did not appeal that merger/resentencing.
- McGee argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of or pursue a timely direct appeal and that his pleas were coerced and thus not knowing and voluntary.
- The trial court found McGee failed to prove ineffective assistance caused his failure to appeal; McGee timely appealed that ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McGee is entitled to an out-of-time direct appeal based on ineffective assistance for failing to file or advise on a direct appeal | McGee: counsel failed to inform or file a timely appeal; this prevented a direct appeal | State: McGee must show both deficient performance and prejudice (a reasonable probability an appeal would succeed); he has not shown prejudice | Denied — McGee failed to demonstrate required prejudice under Strickland; trial court's denial of out-of-time appeal affirmed |
| Whether sentencing error (aggravated battery should have merged with murder) entitles McGee to relief via out-of-time appeal | McGee: counsel's failure to appeal prejudiced him because aggravated battery was separate | State: Any sentencing error has been corrected by the trial court's merger and vacatur of the 20-year sentence | No prejudice shown because the merger and vacatur remedied the alleged error |
| Whether plea was involuntary/coerced, affecting voluntariness and meriting an appeal | McGee: counsel coerced him into accepting the plea; plea therefore not knowing and voluntary | State: Record of plea hearing shows McGee affirmed plea was knowing and voluntary; an appeal would have been meritless | Denied — no reasonable probability an appeal on coercion claim would have succeeded given the plea colloquy and trial court's finding |
| Whether failure to hold a hearing or other procedural rulings below warranted reversal | McGee: procedural errors (timeliness, notice) affected his ability to appeal | State: Trial court held evidentiary hearing on remand and found no ineffective assistance; re-entered order properly denies out-of-time appeal | Affirmed — trial court's re-entered order denying out-of-time appeal is upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (plea in which defendant maintains innocence but admits enough facts to allow conviction)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance standard: deficiency and prejudice)
- Stephens v. State, 291 Ga. 837 (2012) (defendant who pleaded guilty must show counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely appeal and resulting prejudice)
- Mims v. State, 299 Ga. 578 (2016) (applying Strickland prejudice requirement to out-of-time appeal requests)
- Hickman v. State, 299 Ga. 267 (2016) (post-conviction correction of sentencing error can eliminate appellate prejudice)
- Manley v. State, 287 Ga. App. 358 (2007) (same principle regarding correction of sentencing errors)
- McGee v. State, 296 Ga. 353 (2014) (McGee I) (remanding for a hearing on out-of-time appeal/ineffective assistance claim)
- McGee v. State, 301 Ga. 169 (2017) (McGee II) (affirming denial of untimely motions to withdraw plea)
