McFadden v. United States
135 S. Ct. 2298
| SCOTUS | 2015Background
- McFadden sold so‑called “bath salts” (MDPV, methylone, 4‑MEC) that produce stimulant/depressant effects similar to scheduled drugs; he marketed them as recreational drugs and used labels referencing non‑consumption warnings.
- Federal agents intercepted purchases and indicted McFadden on eight counts of distributing controlled‑substance analogues and one conspiracy count under the Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act (Analogue Act) and the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).
- At trial McFadden argued he did not know the substances were regulated analogues; he requested a jury instruction requiring knowledge of the chemical/effect features that make a substance an analogue.
- The district court instead instructed that the Government need only prove the defendant knowingly distributed a substance with substantially similar effects and intended human consumption; the jury convicted McFadden on all counts.
- The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding the only mens rea for analogue prosecutions was intent for human consumption; the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Supreme Court held §841(a)(1)’s knowledge requirement applies when the substance is an analogue and vacated and remanded for harmless‑error review because the jury instructions omitted that element.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mens rea required under §841(a)(1) when substance is an analogue | Government: knowledge satisfied if defendant knew he was dealing with an illegal or regulated substance | McFadden: must know the specific chemical/effect features that make the substance an analogue (i.e., the act‑defining features) | Court: §841(a)(1) requires proof defendant knew he was dealing with “a controlled substance”; for analogues this can be proved either by knowledge that the substance was controlled (by schedule or by operation of the Analogue Act) or by knowledge of the specific features making it an analogue |
| Validity of district court jury instruction & prejudice | McFadden: instruction was insufficient because it omitted the §841(a)(1) knowledge element | Government: any error was harmless because no rational jury could have found McFadden unaware of the substances’ controlled status | Court: instruction was erroneous for omitting the §841(a)(1) knowledge element; remanded to the Fourth Circuit to decide harmless‑error in the first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- Flores‑Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (discussing reach of "knowingly" to object of offense)
- Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (requiring proof of knowledge of act‑defining features in certain statutes)
- Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (scienter requirements alleviate vagueness concerns)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (omission of an element in jury charge is subject to harmless‑error analysis)
- Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (distinguishing ignorance of law from ignorance of a fact that is an element of the offense)