205 So. 3d 1211
Ala.2016Background
- Decedent Louis Chatman died in an apartment fire at Warrior Gardens, owned by Hubbard Properties and Warrior Gardens, LLC.
- The Jefferson Probate Court appointed Elizabeth W. McElroy administratrix of Louis’s estate on June 11, 2013.
- On June 26, 2013, Carolyn Chatman filed a wrongful-death complaint purporting to act as “attorney in fact for Louis Chatman,” despite McElroy’s prior appointment.
- On January 23, 2015, defendants moved for summary judgment arguing Carolyn lacked authority to bring the wrongful-death action because only a personal representative may sue.
- The trial court denied summary judgment; defendants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate that denial and direct entry of summary judgment in their favor.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the wrongful-death suit was properly commenced | Carolyn implicitly argues substitution of McElroy cures any defect and the case can proceed | Only a personal representative (executor/administrator) may initiate a wrongful-death action; Carolyn was not one when she filed, so suit is a nullity | The suit is a nullity because Carolyn lacked authority when she filed; substitution does not cure the defect |
| Whether relation-back or substitution can validate the filing | Substitution of McElroy as plaintiff should relate back and save the action | Relation-back cannot validate a suit that was never properly commenced under § 6-5-410 | Relation-back does not apply; substitution cannot overcome the fatal jurisdictional defect |
| Whether mandamus is an appropriate vehicle to review denial of summary judgment | Plaintiff implies normal appeal suffices | Defendants assert subject-matter jurisdiction issue permits mandamus review | Mandamus granted because challenge is to subject-matter jurisdiction/standing to sue under wrongful-death statute |
| Applicability of prior cases (e.g., Tyson) distinguishing capacity vs. commencement | Plaintiff relies on cases allowing relation-back when initial filer lacked capacity under other statutes | Defendants distinguish cases where action was properly commenced under wrongful-death statute | Court distinguishes Tyson and similar authority; here action was not commenced by a personal representative, so those doctrines do not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Waters v. Hipp, 600 So.2d 981 (Ala. 1992) (wrongful-death action exists only by statute and only a personal representative may bring it)
- Downtown Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pool, 375 So.2d 465 (Ala. 1979) (suit filed by non-personal representative is a nullity; relation-back does not apply)
- Ex parte Tyson Foods, Inc., 146 So.3d 1041 (Ala. 2013) (distinguishable: dealt with capacity under Workers’ Compensation Act where action was properly commenced under wrongful-death statute)
- Ex parte Rhodes, 144 So.3d 316 (Ala. 2013) (mandamus review available for challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction/standing)
- Alvarado v. Estate of Kidd, 205 So.3d 1188 (Ala. 2016) (refusing to apply relation-back in wrongful-death context)
- City of Birmingham v. Davis, 613 So.2d 1222 (Ala. 1992) (procedural rules like relation-back cannot cure violations of nonclaim-bar statutes)
