McDougald v. Kuhn (Slip Opinion), 2020 Ohio 4924

Jerone McDougald, an inmate, filed a complaint for a writ of procedendo seeking an order compelling Judge Mark E. Kuhn to journalize a final judgment of conviction, asserting Crim.R. 32(C) required the jury verdict be recorded in the court’s journal for a final appealable order.
McDougald attached a court docket printout showing an April 30, 2007 entry listing the sentences imposed (four counts, consecutive, totaling 20 years) but he argued the jury verdict itself was not journalized.
Judge Kuhn moved to dismiss, arguing he had recused and that a substitute judge already denied a motion to journalize; the Fourth District converted the motion to one for summary judgment and allowed McDougald to respond.
The Fourth District found the April 30, 2007 judgment entry (signed by Judge William T. Marshall and time-stamped by the clerk) contained the elements required by Crim.R. 32(C) and State v. Lester and concluded McDougald was not entitled to relief in procedendo.
The Ohio Supreme Court granted McDougald’s motion to amend his brief, denied his Civ.R. 12(C) and Civ.R. 55 motions, and affirmed the dismissal: journal entries signed by the judge and stamped by the clerk control (docket not equivalent to journalization), so procedendo was not appropriate because the court had already entered a final, appealable judgment.

Issue	McDougald's Argument	Kuhn's Argument	Held
Whether procedendo may compel journalization of the verdict so a final, appealable order exists	Crim.R. 32(C) requires the verdict be recorded in the journal; without it there is no final, appealable order	The April 30, 2007 judgment entry contained all Crim.R. 32(C) elements (guilty verdicts, sentences, postrelease control, judge’s signature, clerk’s timestamp)	No procedendo: the signed/stamped judgment was a final, appealable order; relief not warranted
Whether Judge Kuhn’s recusal bars issuance of procedendo	Recusal occurred after suit filed and was done to avoid his duty to render judgment	Recusal means Kuhn no longer had duty to act; substitute judge had already denied a motion to journalize	Court did not base decision on recusal; regardless, McDougald lacked a clear right to procedendo because a final judgment already existed
Whether docket notations can substitute for journalization	The docket entry (showing sentences) demonstrates the verdict was not journalized, rendering the entry defective	Docket notations are not journalization; journalization is shown by judge’s signature and clerk’s stamp on the judgment entry	Docket entries do not equal journalization; the signed, stamped judgment controls

State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303 (Ohio 2011) (defines Crim.R. 32(C) requirements for a final, appealable judgment)
State ex rel. Norris v. Wainwright, 158 Ohio St.3d 20 (Ohio 2019) (docket not equivalent to journalization; signed, stamped entry controls)
State ex rel. Hopson v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 135 Ohio St.3d 456 (Ohio 2013) (same principle: journal entries trumps docket references)
State ex rel. Culgan v. Collier, 135 Ohio St.3d 436 (Ohio 2013) (standard for writ of procedendo: clear right, clear duty, no adequate remedy)
State ex rel. Daniels v. Russo, 156 Ohio St.3d 143 (Ohio 2018) (denial of a motion to obtain a judgment entry that complies with Crim.R. 32 is reviewable by appeal, limiting extraordinary relief)