McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149

Background

McDonough, a county elections commissioner, was investigated by Special Prosecutor Youel Smith for allegedly processing forged absentee ballots in 2009; McDonough alleges Smith fabricated affidavits, coached witnesses, and manipulated DNA testing to implicate him.
Smith obtained an indictment; McDonough was arrested, subject to travel restrictions, tried twice (first trial mistrial), and acquitted on December 21, 2012.
On December 18, 2015 (just under three years after acquittal), McDonough sued Smith under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for fabrication of evidence (due-process theory) and for malicious prosecution; the latter was dismissed as barred by prosecutorial immunity.
District Court and Second Circuit held the fabricated-evidence claim untimely, concluding the § 1983 limitations period began when fabricated evidence was used against McDonough and caused a liberty deprivation (i.e., by arrest/trial).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on when a fabricated-evidence claim accrues and reversed: the Court held accrual (and the limitations clock) begins only after the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff’s favor (here, acquittal).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does the § 1983 statute of limitations accrue for a fabricated-evidence claim?	Accrual is deferred until criminal proceedings end favorably; otherwise civil suits would parallel/impair criminal process.	Accrual begins when the plaintiff learns fabricated evidence was used and suffers liberty deprivation (e.g., arrest/trial), so claim was already ripe.	Accrual is delayed until the criminal proceedings terminate in the plaintiff's favor (favorable termination required).
What common-law analogy governs accrual?	Fabricated-evidence claims are most analogous to malicious prosecution, which accrues only after favorable termination.	The fabricated-evidence claim can exist independently of malicious prosecution and may accrue earlier because harm exists regardless of outcome.	Malicious-prosecution analogy controls for claims that necessarily impugn the prosecution; Heck principles apply, so favorable termination is required.
Does Wallace v. Kato bar applying Heck-style delay?	Heck/Preiser principles support deferring accrual for claims that would collateral-attack a prosecution; Wallace (false arrest) is distinguishable.	Wallace shows some § 1983 claims accrue at detention; Heck applies only to existing convictions, so accrual should occur earlier.	Wallace is distinguishable: false-arrest accrues on process-based detention, but fabricated-evidence claims directly challenge the prosecution and thus fall under Heck-style deferral.
Are policy concerns (predictability, incentives) sufficient to adopt the Second Circuit rule?	Favoring favorable-termination avoids chilling defenses, parallel litigation, and self-incrimination risks; it respects comity and judicial economy.	Earlier accrual gives clearer rules and avoids indefinite deferral; favors predictability and prevents prosecutors from gaming outcomes.	Policy favors deferral: earlier-accrual rule would force defendants to sue mid-prosecution or forfeit claims, producing perverse costs; favorable-termination rule better balances interests.

Key Cases Cited

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 damages claim that would imply invalidity of conviction or sentence requires favorable termination of that conviction/sentence)
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (accrual is a federal-law question; false-arrest claims accrue when detention pursuant to legal process begins)
Manuel v. Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (courts must identify the specific constitutional right to determine accrual and applicable common-law analogy)
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas corpus is the proper vehicle for challenges to the fact or duration of confinement; caution against collateral attacks via § 1983)
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecutorial use of false testimony can violate due process)