McDonald v. Miller
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67895
D. Colo.2013Background
- McDonald, a former Denver mayoral appointee, was terminated in May/June 2012 after Wise, a Denver police officer, accused him of sexual harassment.
- McDonald contested the allegations, cooperated with an investigation, but was fired after a meeting in which he was offered resignation or termination.
- He received no written notice or pre-termination hearing; the alleged wrongdoing and termination became public through media later in June 2012.
- In June 2012, press inquiries and CORA requests sought information about his termination; Miller allegedly communicated to reporters that he was fired for serious misconduct.
- McDonald filed suit in November 2012 alleging CORA privacy, breach of contract, and due-process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the court granted the motion to dismiss.
- The court held McDonald’s CORA claim lacks a private right of action, his contract claim is at-will and not breaching, and his § 1983 due-process claim fails under Twombly/Iqbal and case law; consequently all claims were dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| CORA private right of action viability | McDonald asserts privacy rights under CORA via Martinelli, seeking private relief. | There is no private right of action under CORA; remedy is criminal. | CORA claim dismissed. |
| Breach of contract viability | McDonald alleges a binding employment contract based on appointment letter and promise to hire for term. | Denver at-will appointments; no binding contract; oral promise, if any, would need writing. | Breach of contract claim dismissed. |
| § 1983 due-process viability | Defendants violated McDonald’s liberty interests by publishing defamatory statements without a proper name-clearing hearing. | No protected liberty interest; statements were true/public and post-termination; any pre- or post-termination hearing sufficiency debated. | § 1983 claim dismissed; only potential §1983 theory narrowed to Fourteenth Amendment due process but insufficient. |
| Proper defendant and capacity for § 1983 claim | City, Hancock, and Miller liable under § 1983 in various capacities. | Officials in official capacity are essentially the municipality; Miller cannot be individually liable based on alleged link to hearing; claims against City in official capacity survive only to show municipal liability. | Claims against Miller/Hancock in improper capacities dismissed; no §1983 claim survives against them; City claims are dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Workman v. Jordan, 32 F.3d 475 (10th Cir.1994) (liberty interest in police employee’s employment; requires a hearing if the interest is implicated and defamation occurs)
- Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir.1989) (reputational harm needs to be tied to a protected interest; statements must be true and properly publishable)
- Davis v. Roe? (Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth), 408 U.S. 564 (1972-) (due process requires a protected property interest for a hearing; reputational harm alone is insufficient)
- Workman v. Jordan (duplicate for emphasis), 32 F.3d 475 (10th Cir.1994) (establishes elements for a due-process/liberty-interest claim in termination context)
- Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (publication of statements related to termination does not necessarily create a constitutional liberty interest)