McDonald, E. v. Whitewater Challengers, Inc.
116 A.3d 99
Pa. Super. Ct.2015Background
- Erin McDonald, a New York resident and schoolteacher, signed Whitewater Challengers’ written “Release of Liability” in New York before chaperoning a school whitewater rafting trip in Pennsylvania. She was injured during the trip and sued Whitewater for negligence.
- The release expressly disclaimed liability for injuries “EVEN IF ARISING FROM THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES,” included a Pennsylvania venue clause, and warned the signer she gave up substantial rights.
- McDonald moved for partial summary judgment asking the court to apply New York law (which bars such exculpatory clauses for recreational facilities) and to void the release; Whitewater moved for summary judgment enforcing the release under Pennsylvania law.
- The trial court held Pennsylvania law applied but denied summary judgment to Whitewater, finding a genuine factual dispute whether McDonald was economically compelled (i.e., under duress) to sign the release at her employer’s urging.
- On interlocutory appeal, the Superior Court affirmed that Pennsylvania law governs, held economic duress could not be invoked against Whitewater based on alleged coercion by McDonald’s non-party employer, and concluded the release was valid and enforceable under Pennsylvania law, entitling Whitewater to judgment on liability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Choice of law: Should New York law apply, voiding the release? | McDonald: Release formed in NY, she is NY resident, NY has stronger interest; NY statute and law prohibit such releases. | Whitewater: Contract relates to Whitewater’s PA business and accident occurred in PA; PA has greater interest. | Pennsylvania law applies. |
| Whether economic duress by McDonald’s employer (a non‑party) voids the release | McDonald: She was pressured by her school to sign the release and thus economically compelled. | Whitewater: Any pressure came from the school (non‑party); McDonald has no evidence Whitewater coerced her. | Economic duress cannot be imputed from a non‑party to invalidate assent to the contract; no sufficient evidence of compulsion. |
| Validity of exculpatory clause under public policy | McDonald: NY public policy disfavors such releases. | Whitewater: Under PA law, releases for voluntary, hazardous recreational activities are valid. | Clause does not violate Pennsylvania public policy and is valid for inherently dangerous recreational activities. |
| Enforceability / scope of release (does it bar negligence claims?) | McDonald: She did not read the form and did not negotiate terms; release shouldn’t bar her negligence claim. | Whitewater: Release language is clear, conspicuous, and waives claims including negligence. | Release language is clear and enforceable under Pennsylvania standards; bars McDonald’s negligence claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 607 Pa. 1 (Pa. 2010) (articulates standards for validity and construction of exculpatory clauses in recreational activities)
- Tayar v. Camelback Ski Corp., 616 Pa. 385 (Pa. 2012) (distinguishes negligence releases from claims of recklessness)
- Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563 (Pa. 1970) (framework for classifying conflicts as true/false/unprovided‑for and determining which state has greater interest)
- Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1 (Pa. 1965) (interest‑weighing approach to choice‑of‑law contacts)
- Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Walter, 290 Pa. Super. 129 (Pa. Super. 1981) (contractual contacts govern choice of law in contract disputes even when tort occurred elsewhere)
- McCabe v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 356 Pa. Super. 223 (Pa. Super. 1986) (applies contract‑centered choice‑of‑law analysis)
- Degenhardt v. Dillon Co., 543 Pa. 146 (Pa. 1996) (defines duress and the mutual‑assent requirement for contracts)
- Litten v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 220 Pa. Super. 274 (Pa. Super. 1971) (economic duress standard and jury instruction on business compulsion)
- Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc., 51 A.3d 841 (Pa. Super. 2012) (jury question whether worker was compelled to sign waiver presented by contracting party)