426 P.3d 494
Kan.2018Background
- Wilson rear-ended vehicle carrying McCullough (driver) and Risley (passenger); both sued Wilson just before the 2-year statute of limitations expired.
- Both plaintiffs received PIP payments for medical expenses: McCullough from Farmers (which obtained reimbursement from Wilson’s insurer), Risley from AAA (which did not seek reimbursement).
- Wilson moved to bar recovery of medical expenses at trial, arguing K.S.A. 40-3113a(c) operated as an assignment to Risley’s PIP insurer 18 months after the accident, leaving AAA as the sole claimant for duplicative medical expenses.
- The district court allowed the jury to hear medical expense evidence and later rejected Wilson’s post-trial motion seeking to deprive Risley of his medical-expense recovery.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding K.S.A. 40-3113a(c) facilitates PIP subrogation but does not divest an insured of the right to sue a tortfeasor for duplicative PIP damages. The Supreme Court granted review and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Risley) | Defendant's Argument (Wilson) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Effect of K.S.A. 40-3113a(c) after 18 months | Insured may still sue tortfeasor within statute of limitations; (c) only facilitates insurer subrogation | (c) operates as a statutory assignment of the cause of action for duplicative PIP damages to the PIP insurer after 18 months, so only insurer can pursue those damages | Court held (c) facilitates enforcement of PIP subrogation rights and does not bar insured from suing tortfeasor for duplicative PIP damages; insured may recover and subrogation is between insured and insurer |
| Whether (c)’s plain language forecloses reliance on precedent | (c) should be read in context and consistent with precedents preserving insureds’ right to sue | (c) unambiguously effects a transfer/assignment that leaves insurer as real party in interest after 18 months | Court applied stare decisis and precedent interpreting similar provisions to reject Wilson’s plain-language-only claim |
| Whether statutory assignment creates new limitations period or extinguishes insured’s cause | (c) does not create new limitations scheme; insured retains two-year tort limitation to sue | (c) assignment effectively substitutes insurer and limits who may sue after 18 months | Court held (c) does not create a separate limitation that bars the insured’s action under the two-year tort statute of limitations |
| Whether the court should overturn prior cases interpreting (c) | Prior cases and legislative acquiescence support continuing the established rule protecting reliance interests | Wilson urged overruling prior cases based on plain text | Court declined to overturn precedent—no compelling reason to depart; reliance and legislative inaction counseled adherence |
Key Cases Cited
- Potts v. Goss, 233 Kan. 116 (Kan. 1983) (refused to treat failure to serve a defendant as assigning plaintiff’s claim to insurer under 40-3113a(c))
- Foveaux v. Smith, 17 Kan. App. 2d 685 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992) (interprets 40-3113a(c) as facilitating PIP carriers’ subrogation, not divesting insureds of tort claims)
- Hoesli v. Triplett, Inc., 303 Kan. 358 (Kan. 2015) (cautions against ignoring plain statutory language in favor of perceived legislative purpose)
- Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc., 277 Kan. 706 (Kan. 2004) (explains doctrine of stare decisis and its application)
- Lady v. Ketchum, 186 Kan. 614 (Kan. 1960) (worker’s-comp assignment provision does not bar injured worker’s third-party tort claim)
- Jordan v. Lacey, 303 Kan. 1017 (Kan. 2016) (discusses stare decisis as a governor on legal change)