McCullough v. Commerce Bank, N.A., 368 S.W.3d 296

Appellants McCullough and Cranston worked in Commerce Bank's Recovery Department under manager Nesemyer.
McCullough allegedly changed a code to obtain credit; Cranston aided this change; investigation found at least four unauthorized account transfers.
Both were terminated following the investigation.
Appellants later received rights from the Missouri Commission on Human Rights to sue for discrimination and filed wrongful-termination suit; jury sided with Commerce Bank.
Appellants sought Rule 74.06(b) relief for new trial, arguing undisclosed personnel files evidence could have helped; trial court denied under Carthen standard.
During appeal, Appellants filed additional Rule 74.06(b) motion alleging fraud; trial court treated it as an authorized post-trial motion and denied due to Rule 81.05(a)(2) 90-day limit; this appeal challenges that ruling.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 74.06(b) motion filed after judgment is an authorized after-trial motion subject to Rule 81.05(a)(2).	McCullough/Cranston contend it's an independent action not time-barred.	Commerce Bank contends Taylor treats Rule 74.06(b) as an authorized after-trial motion.	Motion is an independent action; trial court abused discretion; reverse and remand.

Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. banc 1993) (authorized after-trial motions; caveat re: Rule 74.06(b) timing)
Bi-State Dev. Agency of Mo.-Ill. Metro. Dist. v. Ames Realty Co., 258 S.W.3d 99 (Mo.App. E.D.2008) (independent action rule for Rule 74.06(b) motions filed after judgment)
Carthen v. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis, 694 S.W.2d 787 (Mo.App. E.D.1985) (test for granting new trial based on discovery of new evidence)
The Bank v. Lessley, 240 S.W.3d 739 (Mo.App. S.D.2007) (exemption discussions regarding time limits on certain motions)
Phillips v. State, 924 S.W.2d 318 (Mo.App. S.D.1996) (treatment of untimely filings; context cited in decision)