McCullen v. Coakley
134 S. Ct. 2518
| SCOTUS | 2014Background
- Massachusetts amended its Reproductive Health Care Facilities Act in 2007 to create fixed 35-foot buffer zones on public sidewalks and ways around non‑hospital facilities where abortions are performed, criminalizing knowingly entering or remaining in the zone during business hours.
- The Act exempts four groups (patients, facility employees/agents acting within scope of employment, certain municipal/public workers, and persons merely passing to another destination) and retains a separate prohibition on knowingly obstructing clinic access.
- Petitioners (sidewalk counselors who attempt one‑on‑one conversations and hand out literature to dissuade patients) allege the zones have displaced them from effective positions, reduced successful communications, and that clinic "escorts" sometimes block or disparage them.
- Lower courts upheld the law under the time, place, and manner test from Ward v. Rock Against Racism, treating the statute as content neutral. Petitioners sought injunctive relief on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the buffer zones violate the First Amendment and, if so, on what doctrinal basis (content/viewpoint neutrality and narrow tailoring).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Act is content- or viewpoint-based | McCullen: Zone targets abortion‑related speech and exempts clinic employees, so it's content/viewpoint based and triggers strict scrutiny | Coakley: Law regulates place, not content; purposes (safety, access, unobstructed sidewalks) are content neutral | Court: Act is content- and viewpoint-neutral (not subject to strict scrutiny) |
| Whether the Act is a valid time, place, manner restriction (narrow tailoring) | McCullen: Zones burden core speech (one‑on‑one conversation and leafletting) and sweep more speech than necessary; less intrusive alternatives exist | Coakley: Zones are necessary for enforceability and public safety; prior measures were ineffective | Court: Act is not narrowly tailored; it burdens substantially more speech than necessary and is unconstitutional |
| Whether exemptions (employees/agents) create unlawful viewpoint discrimination | McCullen: Employee exemption allows facility‑favored speech inside zones, disadvantaging critics | Coakley: Exemption is limited to job‑related functions (not a carve‑out for viewpoint) | Court: No evidence the exemption authorizes viewpoint speech; problem could support as‑applied challenges but not a facial finding of viewpoint discrimination |
| Availability/effectiveness of less restrictive alternatives | McCullen: Alternatives (prosecution under obstruction laws, FACE Act‑style statutes, local traffic or anti‑harassment ordinances, targeted injunctions) would address problems while preserving speech | Coakley: Alternatives were tried and deemed impracticable or hard to enforce; fixed zones make policing easier | Court: Commonwealth did not seriously pursue or demonstrate inadequacy of less‑restrictive alternatives; ease of enforcement is insufficient to justify broad speech exclusion |
Key Cases Cited
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (establishes the time, place, manner test for content-neutral restrictions)
- United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (streets and sidewalks as traditional public forum)
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (analysis of content‑based regulation)
- Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (facially neutral regulation justified by secondary effects)
- Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (listener reactions and limits on content‑based justifications)
- Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (prior treatment of clinic access and floating buffer zones)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (upholding approach/no‑approach statute near clinics; discussed and distinguished)
- Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (upholding polling‑place buffer zones as prophylactic means when narrower tools inadequate)
- Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (tailoring injunctions and forum restrictions)
- Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (special value of one‑on‑one political communication)
- McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (heightened protection for leaflets)