McCrillis v. Hicks
518 S.W.3d 734
Ark. Ct. App.2017Background
- Tabitha McCrillis (biological mother) and Sarah Hicks (former domestic partner) planned and conceived a child via artificial insemination; both participated in prenatal care and early parenting and gave the child Hicks’s surname.
- The parties consulted an attorney and prepared estate-planning documents and an unsigned Domestic Partnership Agreement allocating parenting time if their relationship ended.
- After their separation in 2015, McCrillis initially followed the agreed visitation schedule but began restricting Hicks’s time and ultimately cut off contact; Hicks sued seeking enforcement, joint custody, and visitation, asserting she stood in loco parentis.
- Multiple hearings produced testimony and exhibits showing Hicks’s active parenting, bonding with the child (C.H.), and involvement of her extended family; the circuit court found Hicks stood in loco parentis, awarded joint custody (primary physical custody to McCrillis), set visitation, and ordered Hicks to pay child support into an educational trust.
- McCrillis appealed, arguing (1) Hicks did not stand in loco parentis, (2) equitable estoppel did not apply, (3) awarding custody to a nonparent violated her Fourteenth Amendment parental rights absent a finding of unfitness, and (4) child support should not be placed in an educational trust.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McCrillis) | Defendant's Argument (Hicks) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hicks stood in loco parentis at time of filing | Hicks did not assume parental obligations; lacked sufficient bond | She assumed parental obligations, co-parented, and bonded with C.H. | Affirmed: Hicks stood in loco parentis |
| Whether awarding custody to Hicks violated McCrillis’s Fourteenth Amendment rights | As fit biological parent, custody cannot be abrogated absent unfitness | Best interest of child and Hicks’s parental role support custody award | Reversed: Award of joint custody to Hicks was error (no unfitness found) |
| Whether visitation to Hicks violated McCrillis’s constitutional rights | Visitation infringes parental liberty absent unfitness | Visitation is permitted when nonparent stands in loco parentis and it’s in child’s best interest | Affirmed: Visitation to Hicks appropriate (best interest) |
| Whether McCrillis is equitably estopped from denying Hicks visitation | No estoppel; custody decisions are not contract matters | Promises, conduct, and reliance estop McCrillis from cutting off visitation | Affirmed: Elements of equitable estoppel satisfied as to visitation |
| Whether child-support payments may be ordered into an educational trust | Child support should meet child’s day-to-day needs, not be sequestered | Circuit court placed payments in trust because McCrillis initially refused payments | Reversed and remanded: Child support order into educational trust vacated; support to be awarded consistent with opinion |
Key Cases Cited
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (parental liberty interest under Due Process)
- Bethany v. Jones, 378 S.W.3d 731 (Ark. 2011) (nonbiological partner found in loco parentis; visitation in child’s best interest)
- Foust v. Montez-Torres, 456 S.W.3d 736 (Ark. 2015) (limits to in loco parentis where nonparent had long ceased contact)
- McKenzie v. Moore, 453 S.W.3d 686 (Ark. App. 2015) (definition and factors for in loco parentis)
- Stamps v. Rawlins, 761 S.W.2d 933 (stepparent may stand in loco parentis but custody preference for natural parent unless unfit)
- Robinson v. Ford-Robinson, 208 S.W.3d 140 (Ark. 2005) (parental right subject to child’s best interest; visitation to stepparent who stood in loco parentis permissible)