McCray v. United States
133 A.3d 205
| D.C. | 2016Background
- Four appellants (McCray, Henson, Fortson, Parker) were tried together for shootings and related weapons offenses at Benning Terrace (2009–2011); several co-defendants pled guilty or testified for the government.
- The government’s central theory as to the Buckner death (Count 10) was an "urban gun battle"/proximate-cause theory — participants in a gun battle may be held responsible for a bystander's death even if they did not fire the fatal shot.
- Extensive eyewitness testimony, ballistics, and admissions placed appellants at various shooting locations on May 30, 2010; some witnesses were impeached or had cooperation deals.
- During deliberations a jury note reported a juror had “had their mind made up” since early in trial; the trial judge questioned the foreperson, cautioned the jury, and asked jurors to notify him privately if they could not follow instructions.
- The court denied suppression of McCray’s videotaped confession (found voluntary), denied McCray’s severance motion, sustained most convictions, reversed Henson’s CPWL on insufficiency, and remanded McCray’s and Parker’s cases for a hearing on whether a key witness’s (Faison) mental disabilities affected his credibility.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alleged juror misconduct during deliberations | Fortson: court abused discretion by not individually voir-diring the juror or investigating whether juror had pre-decided and influenced others | Court (defense generally): inquiry needed but should avoid singling out juror; limited questioning of foreperson was sufficient | No abuse of discretion; judge acted cautiously, questioned foreperson, instructed jury to report inability to follow instructions privately |
| Jury instructions: urban gun battle + aiding and abetting (Count 10) | McCray/Fortson/Parker: combining instructions constructively amended the indictment and lowered burden of proof | Government: urban gun battle is a proximate-cause theory; aiding/abetting could coexist; no prejudice shown | No constructive amendment; any instructional error (if any) was harmless because prosecution argued urban gun battle and evidence sufficed for co-principal liability |
| Sufficiency of evidence for various convictions (AWIKWA, ADW, CPWL, manslaughter) | McCray/Henson/Fortson challenged specific counts as unsupported by distance, gun-type, or mens rea proof | Government: eyewitnesses, admissions, ballistics and context of feud permit reasonable inferences of intent and weapon use | Evidence sufficient to convict McCray on counts 8 & 9, Fortson on ADW and related counts, and McCray/Fortson/Parker as co-principals of voluntary manslaughter (count 10); reverse Henson’s CPWL (insufficient proof of pistol) |
| Cross‑examination / investigation of witness Faison’s psychiatric history | Parker/McCray: trial court abused discretion by denying time/expert to investigate 2006 psychiatric report and recent jail behavior to impeach Faison’s credibility | Government: report was old and defense failed to show how expert testimony would affect credibility; court reasonably declined delay | Remand: defendants entitled to a hearing and expert opinion to show whether Faison’s mental disabilities at trial seriously impacted credibility; trial court to determine effect and possibly order new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. United States, 818 A.2d 179 (D.C. 2003) (caution on excusing jurors during deliberations; proceed carefully to protect unanimity and secrecy)
- Shotikare v. United States, 779 A.2d 335 (D.C. 2001) (trial judge must proceed with caution, tact, and respect when inquiring into juror misconduct)
- Peay v. United States, 924 A.2d 1023 (D.C. 2007) (constructive amendment occurs only when trial proof relies on a different complex of facts than the indictment)
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (U.S. 1946) (harmless‑error framework for instructional error)
- Roy v. United States, 871 A.2d 498 (D.C. 2005) (urban gun battle/proximate-cause instruction: participants may be guilty for bystander deaths if conduct was a substantial factor and death was foreseeable)
- Little v. United States, 125 A.3d 1119 (D.C. 2015) (voluntariness of confession reviewed de novo under totality of circumstances)
- Velasquez v. United States, 801 A.2d 72 (D.C. 2002) (Confrontation Clause protects meaningful cross‑examination to show bias; psychiatric history admissible only when relevant to credibility)
- United States v. Baxter, 761 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (defendant must show how psychiatric evidence would be used to impeach witness credibility)