McCoy v. Kincade
2015 Ark. 389
| Ark. | 2015Background
- Parties divorced in 2004 and entered a court‑approved child‑custody and property‑settlement agreement granting joint custody with an arrangement that gave Kincade weekday custody and McCoy most weekends and specified nonconsecutive summer weeks.
- About one month after the divorce McCoy moved from Mountain Home to Fayetteville (over 120 miles away); both parents later remarried.
- In 2013 Kincade filed to modify custody (seeking primary custody); McCoy counterclaimed for a modification as well.
- The circuit court found a material change in circumstances (citing McCoy’s relocation, the children’s maturation and activities, strained parent–child relationships, passage of time, and remarriages) and awarded Kincade primary custody with adjusted visitation for McCoy.
- The court of appeals affirmed; the Arkansas Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the circuit court’s finding of a material change of circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (McCoy) | Defendant's Argument (Kincade) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there was a material change of circumstances warranting modification of joint custody | Move to Fayetteville and children’s maturation do not constitute a material change; passage of time alone is insufficient | Relocation, children’s growing school/social needs, strained relationships, remarriage, and passage of time together constitute a material change | Affirmed: combined factors (especially relocation and impact on activities) support material change finding |
| Whether mere passage of time can justify a material change finding | Passage of time alone is insufficient | Passage of time is a permissible factor when combined with others | Court: passage of time is one factor but not dispositive; it may be considered alongside other changes |
| Whether a parent’s relocation to another city/count y is a material change | Relocation did not materially change custody because parties adapted schedule for nine years per agreement flexibility | Relocation fundamentally altered the joint‑custody arrangement and impaired children’s ability to participate in local activities during mother’s custody time | Held: relocation was a key material change because it substantially affected the nature of the original arrangement and the children’s well‑being |
| Role of children’s preferences and activities in modification proceedings | Children’s increased extracurricular/school interests are ordinary as they mature and do not by themselves meet the material‑change threshold | Children’s testimony that activities were being missed and strained relationships supported modification as in children’s best interest | Court: children’s maturation and resulting missed activities are relevant to material‑change inquiry and to best‑interest analysis once threshold is met |
Key Cases Cited
- Singletary v. Singletary, 431 S.W.3d 234 (Ark. 2013) (standard for reviewing custody modifications and material‑change threshold)
- Stills v. Stills, 361 S.W.3d 823 (Ark. 2010) (deference to circuit court factual findings in child‑custody cases)
- Myers v. McCall, 334 S.W.3d 878 (Ark. App. 2009) (passage of time may be considered in material‑change analysis)
- Hollinger v. Hollinger, 986 S.W.2d 105 (Ark. App. 1999) (factors relevant to material‑change determinations)
- Lewellyn v. Lewellyn, 93 S.W.3d 681 (Ark. 2002) (list of factors courts may consider for custody modifications)
- Alphin v. Alphin, 219 S.W.3d 160 (Ark. 2005) (stringent standards for modifying custody to protect stability)
- Campbell v. Campbell, 985 S.W.2d 724 (Ark. 1999) (restricting modification evidence to facts arising since prior order)
- Doss v. Miller, 377 S.W.3d 348 (Ark. App. 2010) (mutual allegations of inability to cooperate can support modifying joint custody)
- Hobby v. Walker, 385 S.W.3d 331 (Ark. App. 2011) (child preference is relevant only after material‑change threshold is met)