McCormack v. Hiedeman
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32663
D. Idaho2013Background
- McCormack faces felony charge for unlawful abortion under Idaho Code § 18-606; complaints allege she terminated her pregnancy December 24, 2010.
- Statutes at issue include Idaho Code §§ 18-606, 18-608, 18-605 (Chapter 6) and PUCPA § 18-505 et seq. (Chapter 5).
- Magistrate dismissed the complaint without prejudice; McCormack and Hearn sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement of these statutes.
- Ninth Circuit held McCormack likely has facial challenges to §§ 18-606 and 18-608(1); McCormack has standing to challenge § 18-608(2); PUCPA standing issues unresolved.
- Hiedeman proceeds with partial summary judgment motion; Hearn seeks standing on physician challenges and third-party standing for patients; court considers mootness, standing, and merits.
- Court grants McCormack’s and Hearn’s summary-judgment claims on facial unconstitutionality and retains live controversy despite cessation of prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is McCormack’s claim moot? | McCormack’s ongoing challenges remain live despite no prosecution. | Hiedeman’s cessation moots the case. | Not moot; live controversy remains. |
| Does Hearn have standing to challenge statutes? | Hearn faces credible prosecution threat and can assert patients’ rights. | Hearn lacks standing since he is not currently practicing. | Hearn has standing and third-party standing to represent patients. |
| Do §§ 18-606/18-608(1) unduly burden pre-viability abortion rights or are they vague? | Statutes impose undue burden and vague terms like 'properly' and 'satisfactory' create uncertainty. | Regulations are constitutionally permissible safeguards. | §§ 18-606/18-608(1) impose undue burden; vagueness invalidates § 18-608(1). |
| Does § 18-608(2) (hospital requirement for second-trimester abortions) violate pre-viability rights? | Hospital requirement places substantial obstacle pre-viability. | Regulation permissible to safeguard health. | Second-trimester hospital requirement unconstitutional; burdens pre-viability rights. |
| Is PUCPA (§ 18-505 et seq.) valid given Casey and related precedent? | PUCPA imposes undue burden pre-viability and targets viability at twenty weeks. | PUCPA reflects State interest in potential life. | PUCPA invalid as applied pre-viability; categorically bans post-20-weeks abortions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (U.S. 1973) (recognizes right to abortion before viability under due process)
- Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (U.S. 1992) (undue burden standard; state interests before viability)
- Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (U.S. 2007) (definitive vagueness analysis for complex abortion regs)
- City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (U.S. 1983) (second-trimester clinic exclusion upheld as unduly burdensome)
- Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (U.S. 1983) (pre-viability regulation must not impose undue burden)
- Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (U.S. 1979) (viability is a medical concept; cannot fix a single gestational point)
- Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (U.S. 1973) (see above)
- Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996) (viability and pre-viability abortion rights context)
- Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1985) (live controversy and mootness considerations)
- Wasden v. McCormack, 376 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2004) (physician standing in abortion provider challenges)
- Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1974) (pre-enforcement standing doctrine)