McCloud v. United States, 987 F.3d 261

McCloud pleaded guilty in 2008 to drug and firearms offenses; sentenced in 2009 and designated a career offender based on prior New York drug convictions (including a 2000 conviction).
He was sentenced below the Guidelines to 202 months; judgment became final about ten years before his § 2255 filing.
In 2018 this Court decided United States v. Townsend, holding that a NY fifth-degree drug-sale statute did not qualify as a federal "controlled substance offense" for the career-offender Guideline under the categorical approach.
McCloud filed a § 2255 motion on July 23, 2019—one year after Townsend—arguing Townsend undermined the predicate status of his 2000 conviction and thus triggered the one-year limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4).
The district court denied the § 2255 motion as untimely, ruling Townsend was a change in law, not a newly discovered fact. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding intervening case law is not a "fact" under § 2255(f)(4).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (McCloud)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether an intervening appellate decision (Townsend) can be a "fact" under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4) that restarts the one-year limitations period	Townsend created a newly discovered fact—i.e., it altered the legal status/effect of McCloud's 2000 conviction—so his § 2255 filing (within one year of Townsend) is timely	Townsend is a change in law, not a factual discovery; § 2255(f)(4) is limited to newly discovered facts, not subsequent legal developments	Held: Intervening case law is not a "fact" under § 2255(f)(4); McCloud’s motion was untimely and dismissal affirmed
Whether analogies to cases that produced new factual evidence or vacatur (e.g., Easterwood, Johnson) support tolling under § 2255(f)(4)	Those decisions show intervening opinions can reveal or create factual predicates that trigger § 2255(f)(4)	Those cases are distinguishable: they involved newly disclosed factual material or an actual vacatur that eliminated convict status, unlike Townsend	Held: Distinctions are dispositive; Townsend did not disclose new facts or vacate the conviction, so those analogies fail

United States v. Townsend, 897 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2018) (interpreting NY statute under the categorical approach and holding it did not qualify as a federal "controlled substance offense" for career-offender purposes)
Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (an intervening change of law is not a newly discovered fact under § 2255(f)(4))
United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (announced legal rule affecting predicate-status analysis relied upon in related cases)
Easterwood v. Champion, 213 F.3d 1321 (10th Cir. 2000) (intervening opinion revealed factual information about a government expert that was properly treated as newly discovered fact)
Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005) (vacatur of a prior conviction can eliminate a petitioner’s convict status and thereby supply a factual predicate for § 2255 timing)
E.J.R.E. v. United States, 453 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 2006) (subsequent interpretations of law do not qualify as factual predicates for § 2255(f)(4))