143 S.Ct. 2400
SCOTUS2023Background
- Petitioner Dayonta McClinton (then 17) was tried for a pharmacy robbery and an associated killing; jury acquitted him of the killing and convicted him of the robbery.
- At sentencing on the robbery conviction, the government urged the judge to consider the killing (acquitted conduct); the judge agreed and increased McClinton’s Guidelines range.
- McClinton’s Guidelines range rose from roughly 5–6 years to a range that supported a 19-year sentence.
- The Supreme Court denied certiorari; Justice Sotomayor (statement respecting denial) expressed serious concerns about the fairness and legitimacy of using acquitted conduct at sentencing.
- Justices Kavanaugh and Alito filed separate statements: Kavanaugh urged waiting for the Sentencing Commission’s action; Alito emphasized historical practice and precedent (e.g., Watts) supporting judicial factfinding at sentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether using acquitted conduct to increase a Guidelines range violates the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right | McClinton: It undermines the jury’s role; an acquittal should have special weight and preclude punishment for that conduct | Gov’t: An acquittal shows only that guilt wasn’t proved beyond a reasonable doubt; judges may find sentencing facts by a preponderance | Cert denied; Court did not decide merits; statements highlighted the constitutional question |
| Whether using acquitted conduct raises due process or Double Jeopardy concerns | McClinton: Permits a second bite at the apple and undermines procedural fairness and accuracy | Gov’t: Sentencing uses lower proof standard and Watts permits consideration of acquitted or uncharged conduct | Cert denied; no ruling on constitutionality; Watts remains precedent for now |
| Whether historical practice supports judge consideration of non-jury-found facts at sentencing | McClinton: Historical jury prerogatives and acquittal traditions give verdicts special weight | Gov’t/Alito: Early statutes and practice show judges historically considered facts at sentencing; jury-trial right did not require jury findings for all sentencing facts | Court deferred; Alito noted historical evidence supports judicial factfinding; no definitive holding |
| Workability / stare decisis (whether Watts should be overruled) | McClinton: Overruling Watts could vindicate jury role and public confidence | Gov’t/Alito: Watts is workable; barring acquitted-conduct consideration would create practical and procedural problems | Cert denied; justices signaled concerns but declined to revisit Watts now; urged Sentencing Commission action |
Key Cases Cited
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016) (Guidelines provide the framework and anchor sentencing discretion)
- United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (a jury’s acquittal does not bar consideration of the underlying conduct at sentencing)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (discussing sentencing judges’ reliance on facts the jury did not find)
- United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (acquittals have special weight and are traditionally treated as final)
- Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (historical role of acquittals and jury authority examined)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (establishes beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for elements of crimes)
- United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) (an acquittal does not prove innocence; it shows reasonable doubt)