2020 Ohio 1109
Ohio Ct. App.2020Background
- Surface owners Gary and Jerry McClellan own ~74.94 acres in Monroe County; they obtained title via a 2005 warranty deed (and earlier 1974 deed identified as their root of title).
- Early chain: 1901 Williams deed reserved a life royalty; a 1921 McCaslin deed both repeated that life royalty exception and reserved a 1/4 royalty in fee; later instruments (1947 Walters deed and subsequent conveyances) contained a broad oil-and-gas reservation (Volume 120, Page 607).
- The 1974 joint-and-survivorship deed to Elden and Inez McClellan excepted “all oil and gas rights … heretofore reserved (See reservations Volume 120 at Page 607),” and the trial court treated that 1974 deed as the root of title for MTA purposes.
- The McCaslin heirs (Appellants) claim mineral interests tracing to the McCaslin severance; they filed preservation affidavits in early 2017 after the McClellans recorded Affidavits of Abandonment under R.C. 5301.56 and related notices under the DMA.
- Trial court granted the McClellans’ motion for summary judgment, holding the McCaslin mineral exception extinguished by operation of the Marketable Title Act (MTA) using the 1974 deed as the root of title; McCaslin heirs appealed arguing (1) the 1974 deed cannot be the root because it references prior oil-and-gas exceptions, and (2) the Dormant Mineral Act (DMA) controls over the MTA.
Issues
| Issue | McClellan's Argument | McCaslin's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1974 deed can serve as the root of title despite referencing prior oil-and-gas reservations | 1974 deed satisfies temporal and substantive elements of a root of title; it ‘‘accounts for’’ existing mineral interests and is not a severance deed | A root must convey fee simple free of oil-and-gas exceptions; a deed repeating or referring to a prior exception cannot be a root (Christman/Holdren approach) | 1974 deed is the root of title; a specific reference/repetition does not automatically disqualify a deed as root (Blackstone controls) |
| Whether the DMA’s specific mineral-preservation procedures prevail over the MTA so as to prevent extinguishment | MTA applies to extinguish pre-root interests when statutory requirements met; DMA does not displace MTA | DMA’s mineral-specific rules control and should prevent extinguishment under MTA | Both statutes apply; the court followed precedent concluding the MTA can extinguish the McCaslin interest and the DMA does not override that result |
Key Cases Cited
- Blackstone v. Moore, 122 N.E.3d 132 (Ohio 2018) (a root-of-title deed that specifically references a prior mineral interest can preserve that interest)
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 671 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 1996) (appellate standard of review for summary judgment)
- Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 364 N.E.2d 267 (Ohio 1977) (summary-judgment standard: no genuine issue of material fact)
- Dresher v. Burt, 662 N.E.2d 264 (Ohio 1996) (party moving for summary judgment bears initial burden; nonmoving party must produce specific facts)
- Miller v. Mellott, 30 N.E.3d 1021 (7th Dist. 2019) (district decisions recognizing Blackstone’s effect on earlier local precedent)