McClanton v. State
2014 Ark. 439
Ark.2014Background
- In 2005 McClanton pleaded guilty to sale/delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced as a habitual offender to 120 months; an additional 180-month sentence was suspended.
- In 2012 the State moved to revoke the suspended sentence; McClanton pleaded guilty to violating the suspended sentence and to robbery and felon-in-possession in a separate case. He received 360 months in the revocation case; additional 240-month sentences in the separate case were suspended.
- In March 2014 McClanton filed a pro se petition under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111 seeking correction of the 2012 sentence, alleging hurried counsel and insufficient evidence.
- The trial court denied the petition; McClanton appealed and sought appointment of counsel and more time to file a brief.
- The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as meritless and rendered the motions moot, concluding the claim was either time-barred under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2 or not a proper basis for relief under § 16-90-111.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether McClanton’s pro se § 16-90-111 petition could proceed despite being styled outside Rule 37.1 | McClanton argued counsel hurried him into pleading guilty and evidence was insufficient; § 16-90-111 permits correction of sentence | State (and court) treated the claim as cognizable under Rule 37.1 and subject to Rule 37 time limits; § 16-90-111 does not permit attacking plea-based trial error | Petition is governed by Rule 37.1; appeal dismissed as meritless |
| Whether the petition was timely under Rule 37.2 for guilty pleas | McClanton implicitly argued relief was available despite delay | State argued Rule 37.2 requires filing within 90 days of judgment entered of record for guilty pleas; failure deprives court of jurisdiction | Petition untimely (filed more than 90 days after judgment); trial court lacked jurisdiction; appeal dismissed |
| Whether § 16-90-111 can be used to attack sufficiency of evidence after a guilty plea | McClanton sought to characterize his claim as correction of an illegal sentence under § 16-90-111 | State argued sufficiency-of-evidence claims waived by guilty plea and § 16-90-111 does not reach mere trial error | § 16-90-111 does not allow attacking sentence on grounds of evidentiary sufficiency or trial error after a guilty plea |
| Whether counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance during plea warranted relief now | McClanton claimed ineffective assistance in advising plea | State argued ineffective-assistance claims are cognizable under Rule 37.1 and subject to its time limits | Ineffective-assistance claim must be raised under Rule 37.1 within its time limits; untimely here |
Key Cases Cited
- Moore v. State, 2014 Ark. 231 (per curiam) (appeals from postconviction orders without merit will not proceed)
- Ussery v. State, 2014 Ark. 186 (per curiam) (claims cognizable under Rule 37.1 are governed by that rule regardless of label; § 16-90-111 superseded to that extent)
- Talley v. State, 2012 Ark. 314 (per curiam) (Rule 37.2 time limits are jurisdictional)
- Thacker v. State, 2012 Ark. 205 (per curiam) (guilty plea generally waives sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims)
- Skinner v. Hobbs, 2011 Ark. 383 (per curiam) (illegal-sentence claims that implicate subject-matter jurisdiction may be addressed at any time)
- Gardner v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 346 (per curiam) (challenges to sentences within statutory range based on trial errors belong at trial or in Rule 37 proceedings)