McClamma v. State
138 So. 3d 578
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- At 1:30 a.m., deputies responded to a report of a suspicious shirtless teenager walking in a trailer park; no burglary or other crime was reported.
- A BOLO was issued; deputies briefly saw someone run across a street and tracked a scent without locating a specific house.
- An unmarked car later observed McClamma (shirtless, running from a house to a taxi); a marked unit stopped the taxi.
- A corporal questioned McClamma, ordered him out, frisked him (finding a pipe), and arrested him for loitering/prowling; a backpack search produced contraband and statements implicating him in vehicle burglaries.
- McClamma moved to suppress; the trial court denied the motion, he entered a negotiated plea, and appealed the denial of the suppression motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deputy lawfully stopped taxi as an arrest for loitering/prowling | Stop was valid because McClamma matched BOLO, was running from an area, and conduct justified alarm | Arresting deputy didn’t observe loitering/prowling in his presence and had no objectively reasonable alarm | Reversed: arrest invalid — misdemeanor loitering must occur in the arresting officer’s presence and facts here did not support alarm |
| Whether the taxi stop was permissible as a Terry stop for loitering/prowling | Stop was investigative and permissible under Terry-like standards for suspicious prowling | Loitering/prowling typically requires an arrest (not a Terry investigatory stop); officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop here | Reversed: stop not a valid Terry stop — officer had no articulable need to develop further facts to justify alarm |
| Proper mens rea for loitering/prowling under §856.021 | Statute reaches conduct close to attempted crimes; officers may rely on suspicious behavior to detain | Statute requires intentional conduct that defendant knew or should have known would cause an objectively reasonable observer to have reasonable alarm — akin to general intent, not mere negligence or attempt-to-commit | Court: offense requires intentional conduct the actor knew or should with substantial certainty know would cause objective alarm; courts must apply this carefully |
| Applicability of the statute’s "dispel alarm" procedure and Miranda | Officer may question to dispel alarm without Miranda prior to detention | Miranda is required before eliciting any custodial statements to dispel alarm; the dispel-alarm provision functions as an affirmative defense | Court: Miranda required before giving the opportunity to dispel alarm; dispel-alarm is a statutory defense and must be treated as such |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishing stop-and-frisk principles used as language guide)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (custodial warnings required before eliciting incriminating statements)
- State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1975) (upholding loitering statute subject to limitations; describes "dispel alarm" procedure)
- D.L.B. v. State, 685 So.2d 1340 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (misdemeanor loitering/prowling must occur in officer’s presence)
- B.A.A. v. State, 356 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1978) (officer must have specific and articulable facts to justify arrest for loitering)
- Pinkney v. State, 74 So.3d 572 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (intent element comparable to substantial certainty standard for causing fear)