McCaulley v. C L Enters., 309 Neb. 141

Homeowners Richard and Michelle McCaulley acted as their own general contractor for a residence built beginning in 2006 and moved in late Feb/early Mar 2008.
They separately contracted with multiple specialty contractors (plumbing, roofing, masonry, hardwood floors, doors/windows, waterproofing, retaining wall, etc.).
On Feb. 7, 2012 (about 4 years after occupancy), the McCaulleys sued 12 contractors alleging negligence and implied-breach-of-warranty for defective workmanship; no express repair warranties were pleaded.
Seven contractors moved for summary judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-223, asserting each claim accrued when that contractor substantially completed its work; the McCaulleys argued accrual waited until the entire home was substantially complete.
The district court granted summary judgment for the seven contractors (finding each claim time barred) and denied the McCaulleys’ oral motion to file a fourth amended complaint to add an express warranty-to-repair claim.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, holding accrual ran from each contractor’s substantial completion date and that denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When does § 25-223’s 4-year limitations period begin for defects by specialty contractors?	Accrual did not begin until the entire home was substantially complete (late Feb/early Mar 2008).	Accrual began when each contractor substantially completed its separate contracted work.	Accrual ran from each contractor’s substantial completion of its own project; claims were time barred.
Whether district court abused discretion by denying leave to amend to add an express warranty-to-repair claim	Amendment was justified (citing language in an Adams concurrence) and should be allowed to preserve a potentially later-accruing claim.	The amendment was untimely, prejudicial, and futile given lengthy delay and that summary-judgment briefing was complete.	Denial affirmed: court did not abuse discretion because of undue delay and unfair prejudice to defendants.

Fuelberth v. Heartland Heating & Air Conditioning, 307 Neb. 1002, 951 N.W.2d 758 (2020) (statute begins to run at substantial completion; divisible contracts may produce separate accruals).
Adams v. Manchester Park, 291 Neb. 978, 871 N.W.2d 215 (2015) (limitations period runs from substantial completion of project; concurrence discussed later-accruing repair warranties).
Murphy v. Spelts-Schultz Lumber Co., 240 Neb. 275, 481 N.W.2d 422 (1992) (defective-workmanship claims accrue at substantial completion, not at date of specific act).
Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 362 N.W.2d 35 (1985) (same substantial-completion accrual rule applied against general contractor).
InterCall, Inc. v. Egenera, Inc., 284 Neb. 801, 824 N.W.2d 12 (2012) (leave to amend pleadings should be freely given absent undue delay, bad faith, futility, or unfair prejudice).