McCaulley v. C L Enters.
309 Neb. 141
| Neb. | 2021Background
- Homeowners Richard and Michelle McCaulley acted as their own general contractor and contracted separately with multiple specialized contractors to build their Omaha home (e.g., plumbing, roofing, masonry, flooring, windows/doors, waterproofing, retaining wall).
- The McCaulleys moved into the home in late Feb/early Mar 2008 and filed suit on Feb 7, 2012 alleging negligence and breach of warranty by several contractors for defective work.
- Each defendant-contractor moved for summary judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-223 (four-year limitations), asserting accrual ran from the date that contractor substantially completed its portion of the work; the McCaulleys argued accrual ran from completion of the entire home.
- The district court granted summary judgment for seven contractors after finding each claim accrued on the individual contractor’s substantial completion date (all more than 4 years before suit) and denied the homeowners’ oral motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint adding an express warranty-to-repair claim.
- On appeal the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: (1) accrual runs from each contractor’s substantial completion of its agreed project where the owners contracted separately and there was no evidence the projects were indivisible, and (2) denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion because of undue delay and prejudice to defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the § 25-223 4-year limitations period run when homeowners hire multiple separate contractors: upon substantial completion of the entire home or of each contractor's work? | Accrual waits until the entire home was substantially complete (late Feb/early Mar 2008). | Accrual runs from the substantial completion date of each contractor’s separate project. | The limitations period began to run on each contractor’s substantial completion date; summary judgment for contractors affirmed. |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying leave to amend to add an express warranty-to-repair claim late in the summary judgment proceedings | Amendment should be allowed (relying on language in a concurrence in Adams) to add a warranty-to-repair theory that would accrue later. | Amendment is untimely, prejudicial, and possibly futile after years of litigation and after defendants had prepared summary judgment proofs. | Denial was not an abuse of discretion: amendment was unduly delayed and would unfairly prejudice defendants. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fuelberth v. Heartland Heating & Air Conditioning, 307 Neb. 1002, 951 N.W.2d 758 (Neb. 2020) (whether a contract is divisible controls whether separate accrual dates apply when portions of work complete at different times)
- Adams v. Manchester Park, 291 Neb. 978, 871 N.W.2d 215 (Neb. 2015) (substantial-completion accrual rule for home construction; concurrence noted possible later-accruing express warranty-to-repair claims)
- Witherspoon v. Sides Constr. Co., 219 Neb. 117, 362 N.W.2d 35 (Neb. 1985) (limitations runs from substantial completion where claim is defective workmanship)
- Murphy v. Spelts-Schultz Lumber Co., 240 Neb. 275, 481 N.W.2d 422 (Neb. 1992) (same principle applying § 25-223 accrual to construction defects)
- InterCall, Inc. v. Egenera, Inc., 284 Neb. 801, 824 N.W.2d 12 (Neb. 2012) (leave to amend pleadings should be freely given absent undue delay, bad faith, futility, or unfair prejudice)
- Eagle Partners v. Rook, 301 Neb. 947, 921 N.W.2d 98 (Neb. 2018) (standard for reviewing denial of leave to amend and abuse of discretion)
