McCain v. Bank of America
13 F. Supp. 3d 45
| D.C. Cir. | 2014Background
- Pro se plaintiff Terrylyn McCain seeks declaratory relief and injunctions to prevent eviction/foreclosure on her San Joaquin County home, based on alleged consent decree violations.
- Mortgage allegedly originated by non-party, later assigned to Bank of America, N.A. (BOA), which foreclosed and sold to the Property Owner Defendants.
- Plaintiff alleges the deed transfer and foreclosure were improper, based on lack of admissible note ownership and consent-decree constraints; asserts action violated due process and caused emotional distress.
- Plaintiff also names the San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Department and Sheriff personally, claiming they assist BOA in defying the consent judgment.
- California Superior Court in San Joaquin County and related state actors are named; plaintiff frames seven COAs including conspiracy and False Claims Act claims.
- District of Columbia is challenged as improper venue, relying on an unrelated consent judgment; defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) and other grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the DC venue proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)? | McCain relies on the Unrelated Consent Judgment for venue in DC. | Venue is improper; events and parties tied to California; not within 1391(b). | Venue improper; dismissal appropriate. |
| Does issue preclusion bar the plaintiff’s Second and Third COAs? | Claims are new though related to foreclosure; not barred by prior decisions. | Prior judgments preclude re-litigation of the same nucleus of facts. | Issue preclusion applies; Second and Third COAs dismissed. |
| Are the Sixth and Seventh COAs (False Claims Act claims) stateable in light of pro se status and prior dismissal? | Plaintiff seeks FCA relief on behalf of the United States. | Qui tam FCA claims cannot be pursued pro se and lack required elements. | FCA claims dismissed; pro se status not permitted for qui tam; insufficient elements. |
| Does the First COA (conspiracy to violate the consent decree) state a claim? | Defendants conspired to breach the consent decree applicable to mortgage entities. | Plaintiff was not a party to the consent decree and cannot enforce it. | First COA dismissed for lack of standing/authority to enforce the decree. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility pleading standard; not just labels or conclusions)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading must contain factual content to state a plausible claim)
- Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (U.S. 1972) (pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards)
- Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (collateral estoppel and issue preclusion guidance)
- Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Bodman, 449 F.3d 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (issue preclusion framework and final judgments)
- McLaughlin v. Bradlee, 803 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finality and collateral estoppel considerations in preclusion)
- Martin v. Dep’t of Justice, 488 F.3d 446 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (elements of issue preclusion and final judgments)
- Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov't, 108 F.3d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (weighing transfer vs. dismissal in improper-venue context)
- Atlantic Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49 (U.S. 2013) (governs proper-venue transfer and forum-selection considerations)