McBride v. Grand Island Express, Inc.
2010 OK 93
| Okla. | 2010Background
- Decedent worked for NES Rentals as a truck driver; on Dec. 1, 2006, he stopped on a bridge to inspect a minor accident and was killed in a multi-vehicle crash involving the defendants.
- Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court found the death a compensable employment-related accident and awarded benefits to the decedent’s survivors; insurer NES Rentals’ workers’ compensation carrier paid the award.
- Appellants (the intervenors) sought to recover amounts paid as death benefits from the third-party tortfeasor under 85 O.S. Supp. 2005 § 44(c)-(d).
- Plaintiff argued § 44(d) only allows an employer (not insurer) to sue, and that death-benefit payments are collateral-source; Plaintiff moved to sever/dismiss intervenors.
- The trial court granted summary judgment against intervenors; the Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding the employer, not the insurer, has a right to intervene to recover death benefits.
- Certiorari was granted to resolve whether the insurer may recover death-benefit payments under § 44(d) where the employer did not pay those benefits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 44(d) authorizes recovery by insurer or only by the employer | Plaintiff contends § 44(d) allows only the employer to recover. | Defendants argue § 44(d) permits the employer (not the insurer) to recover, and insurer has no standing. | Insurer has no standing; § 44(d) grants an independent right to the employer only, not the insurer. |
| Whether § 44(d) is constitutional under Art. 23, § 7 | Plaintiff asserts § 44(d) is vague and unconstitutional as it restricts damages recoverable. | Defendants contend the statute is clear and consistent with legislative intent. | Constitutional interpretation not adopted; the statute is clear and unambiguous in granting only the employer a right of recovery. |
| Whether the insurer can pursue subrogation for death-benefit payments under any theory | Plaintiff argues insurer should be able to recover benefits as a collateral-source subrogee. | Defendants assert subrogation for death benefits is barred by § 44(b) and not extended by § 44(d). | Insurer cannot pursue subrogation for death benefits under § 44; the legislative scheme bars it. |
| Standing and remedy considerations for intervenors | Plaintiff asserts no standing for intervenors given payer is insurer and not employer. | Defendants argue intervenors lack standing since only employer has right to sue under § 44(d). | Intervenors lack standing; dismissal affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- World Publishing Co. v. Miller, 2001 OK 49, 32 P.3d 829 (OK 2001) (legislative intent governs statutory interpretation; look to whole act)
- Prettyman v. Halliburton Co., 1992 OK 63, 841 P.2d 573 (OK 1992) (subrogation rights under § 44(a) for employer/insurer against third-party tortfeasor)
- Nestle Food Co. v. Crews, 2000 OK 58, 11 P.3d 205 (OK 2000) (§ 44(a) subrogation for wage-related benefits; limits in § 44(a))
- ACCOSIF v. American States Insurance Co., 2000 OK 21, 1 P.3d 987 (OK 2000) (subrogation context under § 44(a) and related provisions)
- Earnest, Inc. v. LeGrand, 1980 OK 180, 621 P.2d 1148 (OK 1980) (death-benefits subrogation historically avoided due to Art. 23, § 7)
- Updike Advertising System v. State Industrial Com'n, 1955 OK 19, 282 P.2d 759 (OK 1955) (historical view of subrogation and death-benefits policy constraints)
- State ex rel. Board of Regents v. McCloskey Bros., Inc., 2009 OK 90, 227 P.3d 133 (OK 2009) (standing requires direct, personal stake and statutory/constitutional nexus)