343 P.3d 1208
Mont.2015Background
- Casino Owners built attached, roofed smoking structures with walls, windows, HVAC, carpeting, gaming machines, and several small high vents; patrons must join a Smokers’ Club to enter.
- City building, fire departments, and Cascade City-County Board of Health (Board) inspectors reviewed and approved the plans and later inspected and approved the structures.
- A Board employee filed (and later admitted to filing) a complaint, prompting warnings and a reprimand to the Casino Owners under the Montana Clean Indoor Air Act (MCIAA).
- Casino Owners sued for a declaratory judgment that the structures complied with the MCIAA; Board sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting smoking (denied); later the District Court granted summary judgment for Casino Owners, relying in part on the Board’s discovery admission that the structures were “partially open to the outside air.”
- District Court additionally awarded Casino Owners attorney fees for the preliminary injunction proceeding; Board appealed both rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the attached smoking structures are "enclosed public places" under the MCIAA | Structures are not enclosed public places because they are not open to the general public and the vents render them "partially open to the outside air" (thus not an "enclosed room" or "place of work") | Structures are part of casinos/bars and therefore fall within the statutory list of enclosed public places subject to the smoking ban; Board also argued dictionary meaning supports inclusion | Court held structures are "places of work" and thus "enclosed public places" under MCIAA; small vents do not convert them into roofed shelters or partially open structures |
| Whether the Board’s discovery admission that structures are "partially open to the outside air" was a judicial admission binding it from challenging statute interpretation | Admission should operate as a judicial admission and preclude Board from arguing the structures are enclosed public places | Admission was factual only and cannot bind the Board on the legal question of statutory interpretation | Court held the admission was factual and immaterial to the legal question; Board not precluded from arguing structures are places of work, but on the merits structures are enclosed public places |
| Whether Casino Owners are equitably estopped from enforcement because Board agents approved the designs and inspections | Casino Owners relied on Board agents’ approvals and thus Board should be estopped from later enforcing the MCIAA | Approvals were misstatements of law; equitable estoppel does not apply to misrepresentations of law | Court held representations were misrepresentations of law, so equitable estoppel fails |
| Whether Casino Owners were entitled to attorney fees for the preliminary injunction proceeding under § 25-10-711, MCA | Casino Owners prevailed on the preliminary injunction and Board acted in bad faith; fees thus appropriate | Casino Owners did not prevail on the merits; a preliminary injunction victory alone does not make them the prevailing party for fee purposes | Court held Casino Owners were not the prevailing party (they lost on final judgment) and reversed fee award |
Key Cases Cited
- Dreyer v. Bd. of Trs., 193 Mont. 95, 630 P.2d 226 (Mont. 1981) (preliminary injunction success alone does not necessarily make a party the prevailing party for fee awards)
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (U.S. 2001) (definition of "prevailing party" requires a judicially cognizable change in the legal relationship of the parties)
- Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (U.S. 2007) (temporary victories at the preliminary stage that are later reversed on the merits do not create an enduring change warranting fee awards)
- Higher Taste, Inc. v. City of Tacoma, 717 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2013) (fees for preliminary injunctive relief possible only when injunction produces sufficiently enduring change)