Mazella Smith v. City of Fort Pierce, Florida
565 F. App'x 774
11th Cir.2014Background
- Mazella Smith was Director of Administrative Services for Fort Pierce from 1995 until her termination on June 14, 2010.
- In Jan.–Feb. 2009 Smith testified in two federal discrimination cases against the City; the City settled those cases in Oct. 2009. Smith alleges her relationship with City Manager David Recor soured afterward.
- In May 2010 Commissioner Tom Perona accused Smith of offering him a bribe to remove Recor; Perona reported this to Recor. Fort Pierce placed Smith on unpaid administrative leave and issued a press release that she was under investigation; Smith denies admitting to a bribe.
- Smith’s counsel emailed the City on May 25, 2010 notifying them of representation. Smith filed an EEOC charge on June 7, 2010; Recor terminated her on June 14, 2010.
- Smith sued alleging retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981/§ 1983, and the Florida Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment for the City; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Smith engaged in protected activity | Smith argued her EEOC charge and her counsel’s May 25 email constituted protected activity under Title VII | City argued the email did not oppose unlawful practices and the EEOC charge post-dated adverse actions | Court: Counsel’s email not protected; EEOC charge was protected but did not change outcome |
| Whether alleged conduct amounted to a materially adverse action | Smith argued Recor’s conduct (glare, slammed door, comments), placement on leave, termination, and unemployment contest were materially adverse | City argued the interpersonal incidents were trivial and Smith suffered no tangible loss from the Consent Decree process or unemployment challenge | Court: The interpersonal incidents and other conduct were not materially adverse; no actionable adverse employment actions shown |
| Whether causation (retaliatory motive) existed between protected activity and adverse action | Smith argued temporal and series-of-actions inference linked deposition/EEOC filing to leave and termination | City argued long time lapse from 2009 testimony, administrative leave predated EEOC filing, and termination was for non-retaliatory reasons (bribery allegation) | Court: No but-for causation—too remote in time; leave preceded EEOC charge; termination was motivated by bribery allegation |
| Whether summary judgment was proper despite any prima facie showing | Smith urged that disputes of fact precluded summary judgment | City maintained legitimate nonretaliatory reason for termination and absence of causation or adverse action | Court: Affirmed summary judgment for City; even assuming protected activity, Smith could not show but-for causation or pretext |
Key Cases Cited
- Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012) (summary judgment standard and drawing inferences for nonmoving party)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (definition of materially adverse action in retaliation claims)
- University of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (U.S. 2013) (Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation)
- Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008) (analyzing § 1983 retaliation claims under the McDonnell Douglas framework)
- Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming that appellate courts may affirm summary judgment on any ground supported by the record)
- Sims v. MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (reconciling but-for causation with McDonnell Douglas framework)