Maytown Sand And Gravel, Resp/cross-app v. Thurston County, App/cross-resp
198 Wash. App. 560
| Wash. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- The Port owned land in Thurston County with a vested special use permit (SUP) authorizing a 20‑year gravel mine if preconditions (notably groundwater monitoring and well testing) were met; the Port missed several deadlines.
- Maytown Sand & Gravel, LLC (MSG) purchased the property from the Port and sought minor administrative amendments to the SUP to cure missed deadlines; County staff initially indicated some amendments could be handled administratively.
- County staff later classified MSG’s amendment requests as "major," triggering hearing‑examiner review and SEPA scrutiny; the hearing examiner approved limited amendments and MSG’s monitoring plan.
- The Board of County Commissioners (BOCC), with commissioners who had ties to opponents, remanded portions of the permit for additional critical‑areas review, delaying MSG’s ability to use the permit.
- MSG sued for damages (tortious interference, negligence, negligent misrepresentation) and, exclusively, MSG alleged a § 1983 substantive due process claim; the jury found County liability and awarded $8M to the Port and $4M to MSG.
- The trial court excluded evidence of attorney fees incurred in the earlier land‑use proceedings; the Court of Appeals affirmed liability and due process findings but remanded on the limited issue of attorney fees as damages.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LUPA barred MSG’s tortious‑interference damages claim | LUPA does not bar separate monetary‑damages claims; MSG sought damages, not reversal of a land‑use decision | County: LUPA is the exclusive remedy for land‑use disputes so MSG’s claim must be dismissed | Held: LUPA did not bar the damages claim because MSG sought monetary recovery rather than appellate review of a land‑use decision |
| Whether collateral estoppel precluded the tortious‑interference claim | The hearing‑examiner decision does not resolve the improper‑purpose/improper‑means element; jury should decide motive and means | County: issues already litigated before the hearing examiner; preclusion appropriate | Held: Collateral estoppel did not apply—issues were not identical and the hearing examiner did not decide improper purpose/means |
| Sufficiency of evidence for § 1983 substantive‑due‑process claim (property interest) | MSG: vested SUP is a cognizable property interest; remand by BOCC deprived MSG of use of that interest | County: no cognizable property interest in claimed process or insufficient deprivation | Held: MSG had a protected property interest in the SUP; sufficient evidence supported deprivation of the right to use the property |
| Sufficiency of evidence for § 1983 substantive‑due‑process claim (shocks the conscience) | BOCC acted arbitrarily/capriciously, with undisclosed bias and private communications with opponents, causing delay—this was conscience‑shocking | County: actions were within discretion and not conscience‑shocking as a matter of law | Held: Sufficient evidence for jury to find BOCC’s conduct shocked the conscience; verdict affirmed |
| Admissibility/recoverability of attorney fees incurred in prior land‑use proceedings as damages | Attorney fees spent to defend the SUP are proximate damages caused by County’s torts and are recoverable (American rule exception) | County: American rule bars recovery of attorney fees; fees not recoverable as damages | Held: Trial court erred to exclude evidence; attorney fees incurred in the separate land‑use proceedings may be presented as damages; remand limited to that issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Pacific Nw. Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of Sequim, 158 Wn.2d 342 (Wash. 2006) (elements of tortious interference with business expectancy)
- Leingang v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, Inc., 131 Wn.2d 133 (Wash. 1997) (tortious interference elements and standards)
- Lakey v. Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 176 Wn.2d 909 (Wash. 2013) (LUPA does not bar separate monetary damages claims)
- Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wn.2d 55 (Wash. 2015) (LUPA appellate‑style review and property‑interest discussion)
- Hadley v. Maxwell, 144 Wn.2d 306 (Wash. 2001) (collateral estoppel test and full‑and‑fair‑hearing standard)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (U.S. 1998) (due process "shocks the conscience" standard)
- Pleas v. City of Seattle, 112 Wn.2d 794 (Wash. 1989) (award of attorney fees as damages where government tortiously delayed/blocked development)
- Rorvig v. Douglas, 123 Wn.2d 854 (Wash. 1994) (attorney fees recoverable as special damages in certain torts)