Mayr v. Osborne
293 Va. 74
| Va. | 2017Background
- Dr. Matthew Mayr performed posterior cervical foraminotomy and fusion intended for C5–C6 on Michael Osborne but inadvertently fused C6–C7; post-op x-rays revealed the wrong level.
- Dr. Mayr informed Osborne and later performed corrective surgery to remove hardware at C6–C7 and operate at C5–C6.
- Catherine Osborne (administrator of Mr. Osborne’s estate) sued, alleging negligence and battery; she nonsuited negligence and tried battery only.
- Plaintiff’s battery theory: the operation on C6–C7 exceeded the scope of consent and thus was a battery.
- Defendant’s facts: Dr. Mayr testified he intended the C5–C6 operation, warned of risk that hardware can be misplaced, and that wrong‑level surgery can be a recognized complication.
- Trial court entered judgment for plaintiff after motions to strike by defendant were taken under advisement; appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether wrong‑level surgery can constitute battery | Osborne: surgery on C6–C7 exceeded consent for C5–C6 and thus was battery | Mayr: the act was unintentional/complication and thus negligence, not battery | Battery requires intentional, substantially unauthorized contact; wrong‑level due to mistake/complication is negligence, not battery |
| Whether failure to disclose risk converts consent into battery | Osborne: lack of warning about misplacement meant consent was uninformed and battery | Mayr: nondisclosure (if any) sounds in negligence — breach of disclosure standard | Failure to disclose is generally negligence; undisclosed risks rarely convert consented procedure into battery |
| Whether expert testimony was required | Osborne proceeded without expert on negligence after nonsuiting that claim | Mayr: malpractice claims ordinarily require expert proof of standard of care and causation | Court: negligence claim (including disclosure breaches) ordinarily requires expert testimony; battery claims generally do not, but battery not established here |
| Adequacy of consent when procedure performed on adjacent anatomy | Osborne: consent to procedure on one level did not cover operation on adjacent level | Mayr: he performed the consented procedure albeit at an adjacent level by mistake | Court: consent to the procedure was to that kind of operation; performing at adjacent level unintentionally does not amount to intentional deviation required for battery |
Key Cases Cited
- Pugsley v. Privette, 220 Va. 892 (recognizing "technical" medical battery where consent revoked or terms ignored)
- Washburn v. Klara, 263 Va. 586 (battery where surgeon intentionally operated beyond consented level)
- Woodbury v. Courtney, 239 Va. 651 (battery when physician intentionally performed a significantly different procedure than consented)
- Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d 1123 (distinguishing negligent wrong‑level operations from intentional battery)
- Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d 180 (expert testimony ordinarily not required to prove battery; issue is consent)
- Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (undisclosed inherent complications usually sound in negligence, not battery)
