Mayotte v. U.S. Bank National Association
880 F.3d 1169
10th Cir.2018Background
- Mary Mayotte (plaintiff) defaulted on a note secured by a deed of trust; Wells Fargo serviced the loan for U.S. Bank. Plaintiff alleges wrongful servicing, fabricated documents, unjust enrichment, credit harm, and violations of RESPA and the FDCPA.
- Defendants initiated a Colorado nonjudicial foreclosure under Colo. R. Civ. P. 120; a state trial court found a “reasonable probability” of default and authorized sale; sale proceeded before the federal court enjoined it.
- Mayotte filed suit in federal court seeking damages, an accounting, cancellation of the note and deed of trust, and a declaration that she holds title; she later dropped any injunction request against the sale.
- The district court dismissed her RESPA claim on the merits and dismissed the remaining claims without prejudice under the Rooker‑Feldman doctrine as effectively seeking to unwind the Rule 120 proceedings.
- The Tenth Circuit affirmed the RESPA dismissal but reversed the Rooker‑Feldman dismissal, holding Mayotte’s federal claims challenge pre‑existing conduct (not the state judgment) and thus are not barred by Rooker‑Feldman; it remanded for further proceedings and left preclusion issues to the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rooker‑Feldman bars Mayotte’s federal claims after a Rule 120 order and sale | Mayotte argues her claims arise from defendants’ pre‑existing misconduct and do not seek review of the Rule 120 judgment | Defendants argue the federal claims seek to undo the Rule 120 sale and therefore are barred by Rooker‑Feldman | Court held Rooker‑Feldman does not bar the claims because they challenge pre‑state‑court conduct, not the state judgment |
| Whether the Rule 120 order is the sort of state judgment that triggers Rooker‑Feldman | Mayotte (alternatively) argued Rule 120 cannot have preclusion/Rooker effects if treated as final | Defendants relied on prior unpublished decisions suggesting Rule 120 orders can have Rooker‑Feldman consequences | Court assumed for argument the Rule 120 order might be a judgment but found Mayotte’s claims still do not seek to set it aside; left effect of Rule 120 (preclusion/equitable) for district court to decide |
| Whether inconsistent federal relief (e.g., quiet title) is prohibited by Rooker‑Feldman | Mayotte claims she can obtain title/damages based on earlier wrongful acts without attacking the Rule 120 proceeding | Defendants argue relief inconsistent with state judgment effectively attacks that judgment | Court held inconsistent relief alone is not barred by Rooker‑Feldman; inconsistency is for preclusion doctrine, not Rooker‑Feldman |
| Applicability of prior circuit precedent (In re Miller, Campbell) to Rule 120 context | Mayotte relied on In re Miller/Campbell distinctions between direct attacks on state judgments and independent claims | Defendants cited unpublished Tenth Circuit decisions treating Rule 120 orders as creating Rooker‑Feldman issues | Court followed Exxon Mobil/Campbell/In re Miller reasoning and declined to adopt a categorical Rooker‑Feldman bar for Rule 120; left open precise finality question for future cases |
Key Cases Cited
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (origin of doctrine forbidding lower federal courts from reversing state court judgments)
- District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (clarifies limits on federal court jurisdiction to review state court decisions)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (clarifies Rooker‑Feldman is narrow; distinguishes preclusion from jurisdictional bar)
- Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2012) (applies Exxon Mobil: claims are barred only if an element is that the state court judgment was wrongful)
- In re Miller, 666 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2012) (federal court may relitigate issues decided in state court under preclusion principles rather than Rooker‑Feldman)