Mayhugh, Kristie
512 S.W.3d 285
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2016Background
- In 1994 two sisters, V.L. (9) and S.L. (7), accused four women (one an aunt) of two episodes of gang sexual assault; trials (1997–98) produced convictions largely supported by Dr. Nancy Kellogg’s medical testimony that V.L. had a healed hymenal tear.
- Dr. Kellogg later recanted her trial opinion based on post‑trial scientific developments (McCann study and related pediatrics literature), and experts now agree the 1994 exams showed no definitive physical indicators of abuse.
- At a habeas hearing S.L. (now adult) recanted, testified her father Javier coerced and coached the girls to fabricate allegations (corroborated by mother Rosemary’s testimony about Javier’s threats and prior false accusations). V.L. has not recanted and did not testify at the habeas hearing.
- Psychological experts (Dr. Alexandria Doyle) opined the original allegations were implausible and the recantation credible; a psychosexual evaluator (Maria Molett) concluded the four applicants are not sex offenders (her opinions relied in part on polygraph results and other validated risk tools).
- The trial/habeas courts and parties agreed applicants were entitled to relief under Texas Article 11.073 (new scientific evidence). The Court additionally considered and granted relief on a Herrera actual‑innocence claim after weighing the totality of new evidence against trial evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Article 11.073 new‑science warrants vacatur | Applicants: Kellogg’s recantation and modern pediatrics would likely have prevented conviction | State: conceded that Kellogg’s changed opinion undermines medical proof but relied on witness credibility | Court: granted 11.073 relief — more likely than not convictions would not have occurred absent the outdated medical testimony |
| Whether applicants proved actual innocence (Herrera claim — clear and convincing standard) | Applicants: combined new science, S.L.’s detailed recantation, expert testimony on false disclosures, evidence of father’s coercion, and psychosexual evaluations show no rational juror could convict | State: emphasized V.L. never recanted and argued credibility conflicts are for a jury; no definitive scientific proof (e.g., DNA) | Court: weighed new evidence against trial record de novo and held applicants met clear‑and‑convincing standard — actual innocence proven; convictions vacated |
| How to treat a single recantation when co‑victim still maintains trial testimony | Applicants: S.L.’s recantation is direct, detailed, corroborated, and logically incompatible with V.L.’s versions; the two victims’ accounts were interdependent so one credible recantation fatally undermines the whole case | State: a juror could credit V.L. and convict; conflicting eyewitness testimony is for jury to resolve | Held: Court rejected pure legal‑sufficiency comparison; credited recantation plus other new evidence and concluded a juror could not rationally convict |
| Role and weight of polygraph/results and expert opinion relying on them | Applicants: polygraphs used as part of comprehensive psychosexual evaluations corroborate innocence; experts can rely on polygraph information as part of an opinion | State: polygraphs are unreliable and inadmissible to prove innocence | Held: Court declined to treat polygraph results themselves as dispositive (Leonard precedent) but accepted expert opinions that were based on broader assessments (risk tools, records, polygraph as corroborating input) when those opinions were otherwise credible |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (establishes Herrera‑style actual‑innocence standard and framework for weighing new evidence against trial evidence)
- Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (court may make contrary findings when habeas findings are unsupported)
- Ex parte Miles, 359 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (multiple new pieces of evidence may combine to satisfy actual‑innocence burden; caution on polygraph use)
- Ex parte Navarijo, 433 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (denial where recantation contradicted viable medical evidence; discusses limits of one‑to‑one recantation vs. trial testimony comparisons)
- Ex parte Thompson, 153 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (granted relief where recantation plus lack of medical corroboration and evidence of motive to lie undermined conviction)
- Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (procedural standards for freestanding innocence claims and role of habeas factfinding)
- Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (recantations must be direct, specific, and credible; vague denials insufficient)
- Leonard v. State, 385 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (polygraph results are inadmissible to prove guilt or innocence and cannot be relied on as standalone proof)
- Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (U.S. 1993) (discusses freestanding actual‑innocence claims and standards for habeas relief)
