348 P.3d 694
N.M. Ct. App.2015Background
- In 1979 Jones purchased a 20-foot-wide, nonexclusive appurtenant easement across land then owned by Clarke for ingress and egress for "personal," "household," and "non-commercial" purposes; the deed expressly named Jones, his family, heirs, and assigns.
- Jones owned Tracts 5B and 5C (the dominant estate at the time); in 2002 Plaintiff Mayer bought the adjacent servient tract that contains the easement.
- Jones cleared and used the easement as a vehicle/foot path to access Tract 5B (at least ~50 times/year for wood cutting, pinon picking, landscaping, occasional machinery, and snow plowing).
- In 2009 Jones sold Tract 5C to Long; after that sale the easement remained the only vehicular access to Tract 5B.
- Plaintiff built a fence using trees growing in the easement as posts, narrowing usable width to ~9–11 feet in places; Intervenors (Jones and Long) sought enforcement to remove the encroachment.
- The district court restricted easement use to historic, limited "household" uses and ruled the dominant estate belonged only to Long; this appeal challenges those rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper source for determining easement scope (use of extrinsic evidence) | Mayer relied on historic use evidence and district court’s consideration of extrinsic facts to limit scope | Intervenors argued the unambiguous deed controls and extrinsic evidence is irrelevant | Court held the deed is unambiguous; intent and scope are derived from the written instrument alone — extrinsic evidence was improperly used |
| Whether dominant owners are entitled to full 20-foot width (fence removal) | Mayer contended fence may remain and limited cleared width defines easement | Intervenors contended deed grants full 20-foot right and fence is an unlawful encroachment | Court held Plaintiff must remove fence to restore full 20-foot easement consistent with the deed |
| Effect of dividing the dominant estate (Jones sold Tract 5C to Long) | Mayer argued division created only one intended beneficiary or an increased burden justifying limitation | Intervenors argued the easement is appurtenant and runs with the land to each subdivided parcel | Court held division does not extinguish or limit easement; both Intervenors hold rights in the dominant estate |
| Whether the division created an additional burden on the servient estate | Mayer asserted increased number of dominant owners or their uses unduly burden servient estate | Intervenors asserted no change in scope or frequency of use occurred and thus no extra burden | Court held there was no evidence of an increased burden; division alone does not unreasonably increase burden and does not justify restriction |
Key Cases Cited
- Varos v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 688 P.2d 31 (N.M. 1984) (undisputed facts become facts on appeal)
- Kikta v. Hughes, 766 P.2d 321 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (appurtenant easement passes with dominant estate)
- Dethlefsen v. Weddle, 284 P.3d 452 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012) (written easement language generally conclusive; ambiguity gates extrinsic evidence)
- Skeen v. Boyles, 213 P.3d 531 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (intent of easement determined from instrument)
- Brooks v. Tanner, 680 P.2d 343 (N.M. 1984) (specific reservation controls; no need for extrinsic evidence)
- Luevano v. Group One, 779 P.2d 552 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (addressed assignability and ambiguity issues)
- Camino Sin Pasada Neighborhood Ass'n v. Rockstroh, 889 P.2d 247 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (extrinsic evidence may clarify an ambiguous deed)
- Martinez v. Martinez, 604 P.2d 366 (N.M. 1979) (definition of rights of ingress and egress)