Maybank v. Fanning, 251 F. Supp. 3d 204

Maybank, a GS-13 logistics specialist, filed an initial Army EEO complaint (Nov. 6, 2014) alleging race discrimination in a GS-14 selection; the parties settled and the Army agreed to a desk audit.
After the desk audit denied promotion, Maybank filed a second EEO complaint alleging retaliation based on his prior EEO activity; the Army accepted it for investigation on September 8, 2015.
The Army did not complete the investigation within 180 days; Maybank wrote on March 22, 2016, requesting an EEOC hearing and seeking default relief for the missed deadline.
The Army produced the investigative file in April 2016 and notified Maybank he had 30 days to request either an EEOC hearing or a final agency decision; Maybank re-requested an EEOC hearing on May 11, 2016.
Maybank filed this civil action on August 17, 2016, before the statutorily required 180-day waiting period after requesting an EEOC hearing had elapsed.
The Army moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; the Court granted the motion without prejudice and denied Maybank’s motion for default summary judgment and sanctions as moot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether suit was premature under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c)’s 180-day waiting rule	Maybank argued he exhausted remedies and that the Army’s failure to complete the investigation within 180 days should estop the Army from raising timeliness	Army argued Maybank filed suit before the 180-day period after requesting an EEOC hearing had run, so suit is premature	Court held suit was premature and dismissed without prejudice because Maybank filed before 180 days elapsed
Whether agency’s failure to meet 180-day investigatory regulation excuses plaintiff’s failure to wait 180 days before filing suit	Maybank asserted estoppel and sought court-created remedy for agency’s regulatory noncompliance	Army argued regulatory violation does not relieve plaintiff of the statutory waiting requirement	Court held agency’s regulatory delay did not excuse Maybank; Title VII and precedent provide the exclusive administrative remedies, so plaintiff must still wait 180 days

Murthy v. Vilsack, 609 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (180-day waiting period is mandatory; premature suits must be dismissed without prejudice)
Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (Title VII balances administrative and judicial enforcement)
Martini v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (premature Title VII suits dismissal remedial rule)
Smith v. Casellas, 119 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (no private cause of action against the EEOC for mishandling charges)