245 F.Supp.3d 1145
D. Ariz.2017Background
- Stephen May, a former teacher, was convicted in Arizona state court (2007) on five counts of child molestation under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1410(A); acquitted on two counts; sentenced to 75 years.
- Arizona defines "sexual contact" broadly (any touching of genitals/anus) but the statute as applied did not require the State to prove sexual intent as an element; instead Arizona law (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1407(E) and § 13-205(A)) placed on the defendant the burden to prove lack of sexual motivation by a preponderance.
- Trial counsel requested a state-law construction (that the State must prove sexual intent) but did not raise a federal constitutional challenge to the burden-shifting scheme; jury was initially deadlocked, later convicted.
- On state post-conviction review May argued ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for failure to preserve the constitutional challenge; state courts rejected the IAC claim on prejudice grounds without deciding the federal constitutional question.
- The federal district court reviewed de novo those portions not adjudicated on the merits, held Arizona’s burden-shifting scheme violated the Due Process Clause / Winship right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, found counsel deficient and prejudicial under Strickland, granted habeas and ordered May’s release.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arizona may constitutionally place on the defendant the burden to disprove sexual intent in child-molestation prosecutions | May: the statute unconstitutionally shifts proof of an element (sexual intent) to defendant, violating Winship and due process | State: legislature may define elements and label denials as affirmative defenses; courts should defer unless extreme examples listed in Patterson | Court: statute unconstitutional as applied — sexual intent is effectively an element and cannot be shifted to defendant to disprove |
| Whether May showed cause and prejudice to excuse procedural default | May: trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the constitutional claim, therefore excusing default under Murray/Strickland | State: even if defaulted, the constitutional claim would not have succeeded; no prejudice from counsel’s omission | Court: IAC shown — counsel performed deficiently and prejudice established (reasonable probability of different outcome) |
| Whether state courts’ rejection of IAC/prejudice was reasonable under AEDPA | May: state rulings were an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent (Patterson, Winship, Strickland) | State: state courts reasonably applied Patterson and Strickland; Simpson and later Holle support burden placement | Court: state courts unreasonably applied federal law; federal habeas review de novo on the constitutional question was warranted |
| Whether erroneous jury instruction shifting burden to defendant was harmless | State: evidence was strong; jury’s eventual verdicts show conviction likely regardless | May: jury was previously deadlocked twice; a proper instruction likely would have produced acquittal or hung jury | Court: error was not harmless; there was a reasonable probability the outcome would differ; habeas relief warranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (striking statute that shifted burden to defendant to disprove malice)
- Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding New York scheme that did not include malice as element but recognizing constitutional limits on burden shifting)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficiency and prejudice)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA review requires assessing possible grounds that could have supported the state decision)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (unreasonable application standard under § 2254(d))
- McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (legislative definition of elements is usually dispositive but subject to due process limits)
- Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187 (2015) (habeas harmless-error standard: federal relief proper when there is grave doubt about effect of an error)